淮安市盐化工有限公司诉股东淮安石油支公司缴足欠缴出资因其不是已足额出资的股东主体不合格被驳回起诉案

 

「案情」

原告:淮安市盐化工有限公司。

被告:江苏省淮安石油支公司(以下称淮安石油支公司)。

原告淮安市盐化工有限公司系被告江苏省淮安石油支公司与汪兆云两股东共同投资设立。1996年4月4日,淮安石油支公司与汪兆云订立了淮安市盐化工有限公司章程,章程规定:淮安石油支公司以货币形式出资668300元,占公司注册资本的51%;汪兆云以实物和非专利技术出资631729元,占公司注册资本的49%。此后,淮安石油支公司实际缴纳出资308300元,欠缴出资额36万元。汪兆云实际足额缴纳了出资。同年6月3日,淮安市盐化工有限公司取得公司法人营业执照。1998年4月11日,淮安石油支公司与汪兆云协商要求转让出资未果。此后,淮安市盐化工有限公司实际由汪兆云单方经营,因资金缺乏,无法正常生产,汪兆云以代理董事长名义多次提出召开董事会,要求被告继续缴足出资,遭被告拒绝。1998年5月28日,汪兆云遂以淮安市盐化工有限公司名义向淮安市人民法院提起诉讼,要求被告承担出资未到位的违约责任。

原告诉称:被告淮安石油支公司在1996年4月4日与个人股东汪兆云订立协议,共同投资成立淮安市盐化工有限公司,同年6月3日经淮安市工商行政管理局予以核准登记注册。依有限公司章程规定,被告应出资的注册资金为668300元,而被告仅在1996年4月和8月两次共投入资金308300元,至今仍欠缴原告注册资金36万元。被告的违约行为使原告经营十分困难,给原告造成了极大的经济损失。请求法院依法责令被告履行法定出资义务,缴足出资,承担延迟出资利息和本案全部诉讼费用。

被告淮安石油支公司答辩称:原告淮安市盐化工有限公司不具备本案的诉讼主体资格,我公司不应向原告承担违约责任。

「审判」

淮安市人民法院经审查认为:原告淮安市盐化工有限公司与被告江苏省淮安石油支公司系公司与股东关系。被告出资不到位,其违约行为直接侵害的是已足额缴纳出资的股东的合法权益,故要求被告履行缴足出资额义务的权利,应由已足额出资的股东行使,原告主体资格不符合法律规定。在审理中,本院已明确告知原告无诉权,原告仍坚持以淮安市盐化工有限公司名义起诉本案被告,本院不予支持。依据《中华人民共和国民事诉讼法》第一百零八条第一项、《中华人民共和国公司法》第二十五条第二款和最高人民法院《关于适用〈中华人民共和国民事诉讼法〉若干问题的意见》第一百三十九条的规定,该院于1998年6月25日裁定如下:

        驳回原告淮安市盐化工有限公司的起诉。

一审裁定后,淮安市盐化工有限公司不服,向江苏省淮阴市中级人民法院提起上诉称:被上诉人是上诉人淮安市盐化工有限公司的股东,其出资不到位不仅侵害了其他股东的权益,亦侵害了上诉人的资产完整权和经营权,故我公司作为已具有法人资格的有限责任公司享有追究股东投资差额到位的诉讼权利。请求依法撤销一审裁定,确认上诉人对被上诉人有追缴未到位注册资金的诉权。

被上诉人淮安石油支公司未作书面答辩。

淮阴市中级人民法院经审查认为:上诉人淮安市盐化工有限公司以淮安石油支公司欠缴其注册资金36万元的违约行为给其造成损失为理由,诉请原审人民法院判令淮安石油支公司履行出资义务。而淮安市盐化工有限公司是由淮安石油支公司参股设立的公司法人,股东欠缴出资,应对已足额缴付出资的股东承担违约责任。公司注册设立时,所有股东认缴的出资额应足额到位。如股东虚假出资或抽逃出资,可由公司行政管理机关或司法机关责令改正并追究法律责任,但不发生侵犯公司资产完整权及经营权的法律后果,故淮安市盐化工有限公司以诉讼方式要求股东缴足认缴股金无法律依据。上诉人的上诉理由不能成立,不予采纳。原审裁定并无不当,应予维持。根据《中华人民共和国民事诉讼法》第一百五十四条之规定,该院于1998年9月2日裁定如下:

驳回上诉,维持原裁定。

「评析」

本案争议的焦点是有限责任公司对没有足额缴纳公司章程中规定的所认缴的出资的股东有无诉权的问题。

按照我国公司法对设立有限责任公司的有关规定,股东的出资方式和出资额应在公司章程中载明,股东出资是公司设立的必备条件之一,属于公司成立之前的一种设立行为。足额缴纳出资是股东的首要义务。我国公司法采用资本确定原则,强调注册资本足额真实,注册资本必须在公司成立时全部缴足。公司法第二十五条第一款规定:“股东应当足额缴纳公司章程中规定的各自所认缴的出资额。股东以货币出资的,应当将货币出资足额存入准备设立的有限责任公司在银行开设的临时帐户”;该条第二款又规定:“股东不按照前款规定缴纳所认缴的出资,应当向已足额缴纳出资的股东承担违约责任”。据此,本案中淮安石油支公司未足额缴纳公司章程中规定的其所认缴的出资额,应当向已足额缴纳出资的股东即汪兆云承担违约责任,而不是向有限责任公司承担责任。股东出资行为作为公司设立过程中的民事法律行为,如虚假出资或出资不到位都有可能导致公司不能成立,因此,应负出资义务的股东的相对人是已足额出资的股东,而不是之后成立的有限责任公司。一、二审法院以原告诉讼主体不合格为理由,裁定驳回原告起诉,是正确的。

 

Link: http://www.110.com/falv/falvanli/jingjifaanli/gsfal/2010/0723/169200.html

Economist: China’s Foreign Policy and International Economic Order

Foreign policy

Our bulldozers, our rules

China’s foreign policy could reshape a good part of the world economy

THE first revival of the Silk Road—a vast and ancient network of trade routes linking China’s merchants with those of Central Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Europe—took place in the seventh century, after war had made it unusable for hundreds of years. Xi Jinping, China’s president, looks back on that era as a golden age, a time of Pax Sinica, when Chinese luxuries were coveted across the globe and the Silk Road was a conduit for diplomacy and economic expansion. The term itself was coined by a German geographer in the 19th century, but China has adopted it with relish. Mr Xi wants a revival of the Silk Road and the glory that went with it.

This time cranes and construction crews are replacing caravans and camels. In April a Chinese shipping company, Cosco, took a 67% stake in Greece’s second-largest port, Piraeus, from which Chinese firms are building a high-speed rail network linking the city to Hungary and eventually Germany. In July work is due to start on the third stage of a Chinese-designed nuclear reactor in Pakistan, where China recently announced it would finance a big new highway and put $2 billion into a coal mine in the Thar desert. In the first five months of this year, more than half of China’s contracts overseas were signed with nations along the Silk Road—a first in the country’s modern history.

Politicians have been almost as busy in the builders’ wake. In June Mr Xi visited Serbia and Poland, scattering projects along the way, before heading to Uzbekistan. Last week Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, made a brief visit to Beijing; he, Mr Xi and Mongolia’s leader promised to link their infrastructure plans with the new Silk Road. At the time, finance ministers from almost 60 countries were holding the first annual meeting in Beijing of an institution set up to finance some of these projects, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Like a steam train pulling noisily out of a station, China’s biggest foreign-economic policy is slowly gathering speed.

Chinese officials call that policy “One Belt, One Road”, though they often eviscerate its exotic appeal to foreigners by using the unlovely acronym OBOR. Confusingly, the road refers to ancient maritime routes between China and Europe, while the belt describes the Silk Road’s better-known trails overland (see map). OBOR puzzles many Western policymakers because it is amorphous—it has no official list of member countries, though the rough count is 60—and because most of the projects that sport the label would probably have been built anyway. But OBOR matters for three big reasons.

First, the projects are vast. Official figures say there are 900 deals under way, worth $890 billion, such as a gas pipeline from the Bay of Bengal through Myanmar to south-west China and a rail link between Beijing and Duisburg, a transport hub in Germany. China says it will invest a cumulative $4 trillion in OBOR countries, though it does not say by when. Its officials tetchily reject comparison with the Marshall Plan which, they say, was a means of rewarding America’s friends and excluding its enemies after the second world war. OBOR, they boast, is open to all. But, for what it is worth, the Marshall Plan amounted to $130 billion in current dollars.

Next, OBOR matters because it is important to Mr Xi. In 2014 the foreign minister, Wang Yi, singled out OBOR as the most important feature of the president’s foreign policy. Mr Xi’s chief foreign adviser, Yang Jiechi, has tied OBOR to China’s much-touted aims of becoming a “moderately well-off society” by 2020 and a “strong, prosperous” one by mid-century.

Mr Xi seems to see the new Silk Road as a way of extending China’s commercial tentacles and soft power. It also plays a role in his broader foreign-policy thinking. The president has endorsed his predecessors’ view that China faces a “period of strategic opportunity” up to 2020, meaning it can take advantage of a mostly benign security environment to achieve its aim of strengthening its global power without causing conflict. OBOR, officials believe, is a good way of packaging such a strategy. It also fits with Mr Xi’s “Chinese dream” of recreating a great past. It is not too much to say that he expects to be judged as a leader partly on how well he fulfils OBOR’s goals.

Third, OBOR matters because it is a challenge to the United States and its traditional way of thinking about world trade. In that view, there are two main trading blocs, the trans-Atlantic one and the trans-Pacific one, with Europe in the first, Asia in the second and America the focal point of each. Two proposed regional trade deals, the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, embody this approach. But OBOR treats Asia and Europe as a single space, and China, not the United States, is its focal point.

Mr Xi first spoke of a new Silk Road during a visit to Kazakhstan in 2013, a year after he took power. The first contracts bearing OBOR’s name—about 300 of them, including a huge hydropower plant in Pakistan—followed in 2014, though many of those deals were already well advanced. The past two years have seen a frenzy of institution-building. Mr Xi has set up a “small leading group” to oversee OBOR. This is an informal high-level body linking government and party organisations. Its boss is Zhang Gaoli, who is a member of the Politburo Standing Committee, the party’s innermost circle. It also includes the leadership’s chief spin doctor and a deputy prime minister responsible for foreign trade. All the main bits of the bureaucracy have been corralled into OBOR.

A financial structure to support it has also taken shape. In 2015 the central bank transferred $82 billion to three state-owned “policy banks” for OBOR projects. China’s sovereign wealth fund backed a new Silk Road Fund worth $40 billion and the government set up the AIIB with $100 billion of initial capital. The bank is not formally part of OBOR but the loans approved at its first general meeting—roads in Pakistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, for example—are all in Silk Road countries.

Now the rest of the Chinese state is mobilising. Two-thirds of China’s provinces have emphasised the importance of OBOR for their development. For example, Fuzhou, the capital of coastal Fujian province, has told its companies to “start businesses in the countries and regions along the maritime Silk Road”; it has set up a free-trade zone to attract firms from such countries in South-East Asia. Many big state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have an OBOR department, if only in the hope of getting money for their projects.

As a result, China’s foreign direct investment (FDI) is increasingly going along the Silk Road. In 2015, by official reckoning, its FDI in OBOR countries rose twice as fast as the increase in total FDI. Last year 44% of China’s new engineering projects were signed with OBOR countries. In the first five months of 2016, the share was 52%.

China’s approach to investment seems to be changing, too. Its OBOR contracts are now more likely to involve Chinese firms managing the infrastructure they build, rather than (as in the past) building them and simply handing them over. In theory, this should give China an interest in working for the long term in Silk Road countries.

Yet while OBOR gathers momentum it is also encountering problems. These are especially glaring in South-East Asia. China is planning a 3,000km (1,900-mile) high-speed rail line from Kunming, in its south-west, to Singapore. But in June talks with Thailand over its section of the line broke down; the Thais said they would build only part of the project, and would finance it themselves. There have been many other such failures.

Also worrying are signs that there are not yet enough viable projects for the vast sums being earmarked. The Silk Road Fund was set up to invest in infrastructure abroad. But two of its first investments were in initial public offerings by Chinese firms in Hong Kong.

Problems have arisen too with OBOR’s leadership. Mr Zhang, the most senior person in charge, is thought to be out of favour after blotting his copybook in March by saying that the economy had had “a tremendous start” to 2016. This contradicted the views of people close to Mr Xi who argue that a slowdown is necessary.

The travails of the European Union—and especially of Britain, which has claimed to be enjoying a “golden age” of relations with China—might make Chinese leaders nervous about Europe’s willingness to support OBOR, though it might also in the long run make it easier for China to exploit rivalry between European countries when doing deals with them.

More broadly, China has many competing bureaucratic interests at stake in the Silk Road project. Reconciling them will be tough. OBOR is supposed to extend Chinese commercial influence, reduce the Chinese economy’s dependence on investment in infrastructure at home and export a little of China’s vast excess capacity in steel and cement. Tensions between these aims are inevitable. Should China give priority to underperforming provinces or underperforming SOEs? Can it help poor western provinces while reducing its spending on domestic infrastructure?

Ready or not, here they come

All that said, there are reasons for thinking the new Silk Road will be paved, albeit not with gold. Most important, Asia needs new infrastructure—about $770 billion a year of it until 2020, according to the Asian Development Bank. This demand should eventually ease today’s worries about a lack of projects. Bert Hofman, the World Bank’s chief in Beijing, adds that individual countries will benefit more if they align their plans with one other and with China. It does not pay to plan and build separately.

Next, China needs OBOR. At home, its businesses are being squeezed by rising costs and growing demands that they pay more attention to protecting the environment. It makes sense for them to shift some manufacturing overseas—as long as the infrastructure is there.

Lastly, Xi Jinping needs it. He has made OBOR such a central part of his foreign policy and has gone to such lengths to swing the bureaucracy behind the project that it is too late to step back now.

None of this means the new Silk Road will be efficient, nor does it mean China’s plans will always be welcome in countries suspicious of its expanding reach. But the building blocks are in place. The first projects are up and running. OBOR is already beginning to challenge the notion of Europe and Asia existing side by side as different trading blocs.

Two Economist Reports on FIE Law in China

Business in China

Mixed messages

A missed opportunity to improve the environment for foreign companies in China

LI KEQIANG, China’s prime minister, made a big promise to the world’s leading businessmen at the World Economic Forum’s annual gathering in Davos in January 2015. It was that China would introduce a new legal regime for foreign investment that would “treat Chinese and foreign companies as equals”. Its government has duly unveiled a set of revisions to its foreign-investment laws that come into force on October 1st. The standing committee of the National People’s Congress adopted the laws earlier this month and bureaucrats have drafted detailed rules.

The revisions, and the extent to which they fulfil Mr Li’s grand pledge, are an important indicator of how serious the government is about pursuing other initiatives to liberalise rules on foreign investment. China is currently negotiating a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) with the United States. American businesses hope it will lead to greater market access. A BIT with Europe is scheduled to follow.

How, then, do the changes measure up? On the face of it, they involve a welcome shift away from the current regime, which obliges foreign firms to win numerous approvals and is both burdensome and often influenced by domestic politics. The new framework pursues efficiency. Instead of demanding approvals, it seeks to usher in a simpler, registration-based system. Whereas the current approach is based on a long list of strategic industries in which foreign investment is either restricted or off-limits, the overhaul promises to replace it with a relatively short “negative list” of forbidden investments in areas such as defence and media. According to some, such as Hogan Lovells, a law firm, the reforms herald a sea-change in China’s foreign direct investment (FDI) regime.

Yet the revisions leave intact much that is wrong. China has kept a complex set of rules restricting inflows for decades. As well as the long-standing practice of deeming many industries strategic, the government still requires foreign firms to form joint ventures with Chinese companies and to hand over intellectual property via technology transfers. Repatriation of profits is tightly controlled. And because the approvals-based approach is likely to persist, despite official promises, every foreign investment is subject to the vagaries and corruption that comes with a one-party, highly bureaucratic state.

Most glaringly, there is nothing in the new changes that genuinely places foreign firms on an equal legal footing with local ones. The EU Chamber of Commerce in China dismissed the new reforms as “not bold enough”. It issued a thinly veiled warning that the EU may make it harder for Chinese to invest in Europe.

Another big omission is the government’s failure to tackle the problem of offshore legal structures known as variable interest entities (VIEs). Foreign investment is banned in Chinese internet companies, but by getting foreigners to put money into VIEs to which the Chinese firm promises to pay dividends, many firms have got around this ban. A proper reform would have ended the ambiguity surrounding these vehicles. It was not forthcoming.

The tape is red

There are already signs of bureaucratic resistance even to the government’s modest revisions. It is questionable, for example, whether officials will accept the shift from an approvals-based scheme to a registration system. Bureaucrats at the top economic planning agency, the National Development and Reform Commission, are said to reject the idea that the approvals-based system is coming to an end. They say the new rules are just a modification of the existing approach to foreign investment.

Meanwhile, multinationals are no longer clamouring to put money into China’s slowing economy. FDI has been flooding into the Middle Kingdom for two decades. Inbound direct investment reached a peak of nearly $300 billion in 2013 but has cooled off since. Foreign inflows are slowing just as Chinese outward investments are skyrocketing (see chart). It seems exactly the right moment to roll out the welcome mat, but the changes going into effect fall well short of what multinationals had hoped for. As Jake Parker of the US China Business Council, a lobby group for big American firms, points out, Chinese leaders have talked about lots of reforms but “the lack of implementation has created uncertainty about the policy direction and undermined confidence.”

Foreign firms in China

You’re still welcome

The country’s leaders seek to reassure nervous foreign businesses

THE bosses of foreign firms with operations in China grumble that their lives have got harder of late. China used to be a frontier market offering endless double-digit growth. Officials put out the welcome mat, and were open to wining and dining. Regulators were no more bothersome than in other emerging markets.

Now, growth is slowing: official data released this week confirm that the economy grew by 7.4% last year, the slowest rate in 24 years. A crackdown on official corruption has made it impossible to win friends in government. And antitrust authorities have taken a tough line with foreign carmakers, drugmakers and other firms that had hoped their guanxi (connections) offered them protection. Many foreign bosses are now convinced that the golden age for multinationals in China is over.

That may explain the charm offensive the government launched this week. The prime minister, Li Keqiang, led a delegation of Chinese worthies to the World Economic Forum’s meeting in Davos, Switzerland. He promised the assembled global business elite his country would “treat Chinese and foreign companies as equals” and “rigorously reject protectionism”.

Ahead of his speech the government unveiled a dramatic proposal to ease its restrictions on foreign investment. Over the past two decades, China has maintained a highly restrictive, complex set of rules on how foreigners can invest on the mainland. In the many industries deemed “strategic”, for example, they must invest only through a joint venture and must transfer technology to the local partner. Flows of funds in and out of the country are also tightly controlled.

The draft reforms, which are now open for comment, include scrapping almost all of these cumbersome controls. Foreign firms would supposedly be treated the same way as national ones. The clunky system of case-by-case approvals will be replaced by a simpler “negative list”: if your industry is not on it, you do not need permission to invest. Daniel Roules of the Shanghai office of Squire Patton Boggs, an American law firm, believes the new law—if and when it comes into force—could usher in a significant and welcome change in the climate for foreign firms.

Mr Li is also pushing for bilateral investment treaties with the United States and the European Union, which could further reassure foreign investors worried about putting more money into China. His boss, Xi Jinping, agreed a sweeping free-trade agreement with Australia on the heels of the recent G20 summit in Brisbane. This provisional deal, which must now be ratified, goes much further than previous accords in opening up China’s service industries to foreign investment.

Taken together, say optimists, there could yet be another golden age for foreign direct investment (FDI) into China. A recent report by King & Wood Mallesons, China’s biggest law firm, forecasts that FDI could reach $188 billion in 2020, up from about $120 billion last year.

Nevertheless, foreign businesspeople should not break out the champagne yet. The proposed reforms are a strong signal that foreign money will continue to be welcome in China. However, they may do nothing to help foreign-owned firms compete on equal terms with politically well-connected domestic ones, to end the subsidies lavished on state-backed enterprises, or to rein in regulators keen on bashing outsiders. The areas of business most tempting for foreigners, such as finance and the internet, will still have restrictions on foreign ownership. If China’s leaders were to take on all these distortions, then they would get a far warmer round of applause at their next Davos appearance.

商务部关于《外商投资企业设立及变更备案管理暂行办法》(征求意见稿)公开征求意见的通知

文章来源:商务部条约法律司

2016-09-03 12:00
文章类型:原创 内容分类:政策
查看他人的意见和建议
 
  为在全国范围内复制推广自由贸易试验区的试点经验,实行外商投资准入前国民待遇加负面清单管理模式,2016年9月3日,十二届全国人大常委会第二十二次会议表决通过了《全国人民代表大会常务委员会关于修改〈中华人民共和国外资企业法〉等四部法律的决定》(以下简称《决定》)。《决定》将于2016年10月1日起施行。

《决定》对《中华人民共和国外资企业法》、《中华人民共和国合资经营企业法》、《中华人民共和国合作经营企业法》以及《中华人民共和国台湾同胞投资保护法》相关行政审批条款作出修改,将不涉及国家规定准入特别管理措施的外商投资企业和台胞投资企业的设立及变更,由审批改为备案管理。为确保法律衔接顺畅,做好备案管理工作,商务部起草了《外商投资企业设立及变更备案管理暂行办法》(征求意见稿)(以下简称《征求意见稿》)。《征求意见稿》全面贯彻落实简政放权、放管结合、协同监管的要求,就适用范围、备案程序、监督检查、法律责任等内容做出规范,同时规定港澳台投资者投资备案事项参照本办法办理。

作为重要配套措施,有关外商投资企业设立及变更备案管理的规定,需与《决定》同时施行。为广泛听取社会各界意见,现将《征求意见稿》向社会公布。公众可以通过以下途径提出意见:

1.登陆商务部网站(网址:http://www.mofcom.gov.cn)进入“征求意见”点击“《外商投资企业设立及变更备案管理暂行办法》(征求意见稿)征求意见”提出意见。

2.电子邮件:investmentlaw@mofcom.gov.cn

3.传真:010-65198905。

4.信函:北京市东长安街2号商务部条约法律司,邮编:100731。

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商 务 部
2016年9月3日

 

外商投资企业设立及变更备案管理暂行办法

(征求意见稿)

 

第一章 总则

第一条(目的和依据)为进一步扩大对外开放,推进外商投资管理体制改革,完善法治化、国际化、便利化的营商环境,根据《中华人民共和国中外合资经营企业法》、《中华人民共和国中外合作经营企业法》、《中华人民共和国外资企业法》、《中华人民共和国公司法》及相关法律、行政法规及国务院决定,制定本办法。

第二条(适用范围)外商投资企业的设立及变更,不涉及国家规定实施准入特别管理措施(负面清单)的,适用本办法。

第三条(备案机构)国务院商务主管部门,各省、自治区、直辖市、计划单列市、新疆生产建设兵团、副省级城市的商务主管部门,以及自由贸易试验区、国家级经济技术开发区的相关机构是外商投资企业设立及变更的备案机构。

国务院商务主管部门负责统筹和指导全国范围内外商投资企业设立及变更的备案管理工作。

省、自治区、直辖市、计划单列市、新疆生产建设兵团、副省级城市的商务主管部门,自由贸易试验区、国家级经济技术开发区的相关机构负责本区域内外商投资企业设立及变更的备案管理工作。

备案机构通过外商投资综合管理信息系统(以下简称备案系统)开展备案工作。

第四条(如实备案)外商投资企业或其投资者应当依照本办法真实、准确、完整地提供备案信息,填写备案申报承诺书,不得有虚假记载、误导性陈述或重大遗漏。外商投资企业或其投资者应妥善保存与已提交备案信息相关的证明材料。

第二章 备案程序

第五条(企业设立备案)设立外商投资企业,属于本办法规定的备案范围的,在取得企业名称预核准后,应由全体投资者(或外商投资股份有限公司的全体发起人,以下简称全体发起人)指定的代表或共同委托的代理人在营业执照签发前,或由外商投资企业指定的代表或委托的代理人在营业执照签发后30日内,通过备案系统,在线填报和提交《外商投资企业设立备案申报表》(以下简称《设立申报表》)及相关文件,办理设立备案手续。

第六条(企业变更备案)属于本办法规定的备案范围的外商投资企业,发生以下变更事项的,应由外商投资企业指定的代表或委托的代理人在变更事项发生后30日内通过备案系统在线填报和提交《外商投资企业变更备案申报表》(以下简称《变更申报表》)及相关文件,办理变更备案手续:

(一)外商投资企业基本信息变更,包括名称、注册地址、企业类型、经营期限、投资行业、业务类型、经营范围、项目性质、注册资本、投资总额、组织机构构成、法定代表人、外商投资企业最终实际控制人信息、联系人及联系方式变更;

(二)外商投资企业投资者基本信息变更,包括姓名(名称)、国籍或地址(注册地或注册地址)、证照类型及号码、认缴出资额、出资方式、出资期限、资金来源地、投资者类型变更;

(三)股权(股份)、合作权益变更,包括股权质押;

(四)合并、分立、终止;

(五)外资企业财产权益对外抵押转让;

(六)中外合作企业外国合作者先行回收投资;

(七)中外合作企业委托经营管理。

外商投资企业最高权力机构作出变更决议或决定的时间为外商投资企业变更事项的发生时间;法律法规对外商投资企业变更事项的生效条件另有要求的,以满足相应要求的时间为变更事项的发生时间。

第七条(在线提交文件)外商投资企业或其投资者办理外商投资企业设立或变更备案手续,需通过备案系统上传提交以下文件:

(一)外商投资企业名称预先核准材料或外商投资企业营业执照;

(二)外商投资企业全体投资者(或全体发起人)或其授权代表签署的《外商投资企业设立备案申报承诺书》,或外商投资企业法定代表人或其授权代表签署的《外商投资企业变更备案申报承诺书》;

(三)全体投资者(或全体发起人)或外商投资企业指定代表或者共同委托代理人的证明,包括授权委托书及被委托人的身份证明;

(四)外商投资企业投资者或法定代表人委托他人签署相关文件的证明,包括授权委托书及被委托人的身份证明(未委托他人签署相关文件的,无需提供);

(五)投资者主体资格证明或自然人身份证明(变更事项不涉及投资者基本信息变更的,无需提供);

(六)法定代表人自然人身份证明(变更事项不涉及法定代表人变更的,无需提供)。

第八条(实际投资变化备案)外商投资企业的投资者在营业执照签发前已提交备案信息的,如实际投资情况发生变化,应在营业执照签发后30日内向备案机构就变化情况履行变更备案手续。

第九条(已设立企业的变更备案)在本办法实施前已批准设立的外商投资企业发生变更,且属于本办法规定的备案范围的,应办理备案手续,完成备案的,其《外商投资企业批准证书》同时失效。

第十条(备案转为审批)备案管理的外商投资企业发生的变更事项涉及外商投资准入特别管理措施(负面清单)的,应按照外商投资相关法律法规办理审批手续。

第十一条(备案办理程序)外商投资企业或其投资者在线提交《设立申报表》或《变更申报表》及相关文件后,备案机构对填报信息形式上的完整性和准确性进行核对,并对申报事项是否属于备案范围进行甄别。属于本办法规定的备案范围的,备案机构应在3个工作日内完成备案。不属于备案范围的,备案机构应在线通知外商投资企业或其投资者按有关规定办理,并通知相关部门依法处理。

备案机构发现外商投资企业或其投资者填报的信息形式上不完整、不准确,或需要其对经营范围作出进一步说明的,应一次性告知其在15日内在线补充提交相关信息。提交补充信息的时间不计入备案机构的备案时限。如外商投资企业或其投资者未能在15日内补齐相关信息,备案机构将在线告知外商投资企业或其投资者未完成备案。外商投资企业或其投资者可就同一设立或变更事项另行提出备案申请,已实施该设立或变更事项的,应于7日内另行提出。

备案机构应通过备案系统发布备案结果并在线通知外商投资企业或其投资者。外商投资企业或其投资者可在备案系统中查询备案结果信息。

第十二条(领取备案回执)收到备案完成通知后,外商投资企业或其投资者可凭外商投资企业名称预核准材料(复印件)或外商投资企业营业执照(复印件)向备案机构领取《外商投资企业设立备案回执》或《外商投资企业变更备案回执》(以下简称《备案回执》)。

第十三条(备案回执内容)备案机构出具的《备案回执》载明如下内容:

(一)外商投资企业或其投资者已提交设立或变更备案申报材料,且符合形式要求;

(二)备案的外商投资企业设立或变更事项;

(三)该外商投资企业设立或变更事项属于备案范围;

(四)是否符合国家相关减免税规定及减免税范围。

第三章 监督管理

第十四条(监督检查)备案机构对外商投资企业及其投资者遵守本办法情况实施监督检查。

备案机构可采取定期抽查、根据举报进行检查、根据有关部门或司法机关的建议和反映的情况进行检查,以及依职权启动检查等方式开展监督检查。

备案机构与公安、国有资产、海关、税务、工商、证券、外汇等有关行政管理部门应密切协同配合,加强信息共享。备案机构在监督检查的过程中发现外商投资企业或其投资者有不属于本部门管理职责的违法违规行为,应及时通报有关部门。

第十五条(抽查方式)备案机构应当按照公平规范的要求,根据外商投资企业的备案编号等随机摇号,确定抽查的企业,对外商投资企业及其投资者进行监督检查。抽查结果由备案机构通过商务部外商投资信息公示系统予以公示。

第十六条(根据举报检查)公民、法人或其他组织发现外商投资企业或其投资者存在违反本办法的行为的,可以向备案机构举报。举报采取书面形式,有明确的被举报人,并提供相关事实和证据的,备案机构接到举报后应当进行必要的核查。

第十七条(根据有关部门建议检查)其他有关部门或司法机关在履行其职责的过程中,发现外商投资企业或其投资者有违反本办法的行为的,可以向备案机构提出监督检查的建议,备案机构接到相关建议后应当及时进行核查。

第十八条(依职权启动检查)对于未按本办法的规定进行备案,或曾有备案不实、对监督检查不予配合、拒不履行备案机构作出的行政处罚决定记录的外商投资企业或其投资者,备案机构可依职权对其启动检查。

第十九条(监督检查的内容)备案机构对外商投资企业及其投资者进行监督检查的内容包括:

(一)是否按照本办法规定履行备案手续;

(二)外商投资企业或其投资者所填报的备案信息是否真实、准确、完整;

(三)是否在外商投资准入特别管理措施中所列的禁止投资领域开展投资经营活动;

(四)是否未经审批在外商投资准入特别管理措施中所列的限制投资领域开展投资经营活动;

(五)是否存在触发国家安全审查的情形;

(六)是否履行备案机构作出的行政处罚决定。

第二十条(配合检查)检查时,备案机构可以依法查阅或者要求被检查人提供有关材料,被检查人应当如实提供。

第二十一条(检查纪律)备案机构实施检查不得妨碍被检查人正常的生产经营活动,不得接受被检查人提供的财物或者服务,不得谋取其他非法利益。

第二十二条(诚信档案)备案机构和其他主管部门在监督检查中掌握的反映外商投资企业或其投资者诚信状况的信息,应记入商务部外商投资诚信档案系统。其中,对于未按本办法规定进行备案、备案不实、对监督检查不予配合或拒不履行备案机构作出的行政处罚决定的,备案机构应将相关诚信信息以适当方式通过商务部外商投资信息公示系统予以公示。

商务部与相关部门共享外商投资企业及其投资者的诚信信息。

备案机构依据前二款公示或者共享的诚信信息不得含有外商投资企业或其投资者的个人隐私、商业秘密,或国家秘密。

第二十三条(诚信信息修正)外商投资企业及其投资者可以查询商务部外商投资诚信档案系统中的自身诚信信息,如认为有关信息记录不完整或者有错误的,可以提供相关证明材料并向备案机构申请修正。经核查属实的,予以修正。

第四章 法律责任

第二十四条(违反备案义务的法律责任)外商投资企业或其投资者违反本办法的规定,未能按期履行或逃避履行备案义务,或在进行备案时隐瞒真实情况、存在重大遗漏、提供误导性或虚假信息的,备案机构应责令限期改正;逾期不改正,或情节严重的,处违法所得1倍以上3倍以下的罚款,但最高不得超过3万元。

第二十五条(违反准入许可的法律责任)外商投资企业或其投资者未经审批在外商投资准入特别管理措施所列的限制投资领域开展投资经营活动的,备案机构应责令其限期改正,停止开展相关投资经营活动,并处违法所得3倍的罚款,但最高不得超过3万元。

第二十六条(在不得投资领域投资的法律责任)外商投资企业或其投资者在外商投资准入特别管理措施所列的禁止投资领域开展投资经营活动的,备案机构应责令停止开展相关投资经营活动、限期处分股权或其他资产,并处违法所得3倍的罚款,但最高不得超过3万元。

第二十七条(不配合监督检查的法律责任)外商投资企业或其投资者逃避、拒绝或以其他方式阻挠备案机构监督检查的,由备案机构责令改正,可处1万元以下的罚款。

第二十八条(公职人员的法律责任)备案机构工作人员在备案或监督管理的过程中滥用职权、玩忽职守、徇私舞弊、索贿受贿的,依法给予行政处分;构成犯罪的,依法追究刑事责任。

第五章 附则

第二十九条(反垄断审查)外商投资事项涉及反垄断审查的,按相关规定办理。

第三十条(依职权提起国家安全审查)外商投资事项涉及国家安全审查的,按相关规定办理。备案机构在办理备案手续或监督检查时发现该外商投资事项属于国家安全审查范围,而外商投资企业的投资者未向商务部提出国家安全审查申请的,备案机构应及时告知投资者向商务部提出安全审查申请,并暂停办理相关手续,同时将有关情况报商务部。

第三十一条(投资性公司、创业投资企业、股权投资企业)外商投资的投资性公司、创业投资企业、股权投资企业视同外国投资者,适用本办法。

第三十二条(港澳台投资者备案)香港特别行政区、澳门特别行政区、台湾地区投资者投资不涉及国家规定实施准入特别管理措施的,参照本办法办理。

第三十三条(港澳服务提供者备案)香港服务提供者在内地仅投资《<内地与香港关于建立更紧密经贸关系的安排>服务贸易协议》对香港开放的服务贸易领域,澳门服务提供者在内地仅投资《<内地与澳门关于建立更紧密经贸关系的安排>服务贸易协议》对澳门开放的服务贸易领域,其公司设立及变更的备案按照《港澳服务提供者在内地投资备案管理办法(试行)》办理。

第三十四条(解释部门)本办法由商务部负责解释。

第三十五条(施行日期)本办法自  年  月  日起施行。

 

附件:1.外商投资企业设立备案申报材料

2.外商投资企业变更备案申报材料

3.外商投资企业设立备案回执

4.外商投资企业变更备案回执

Advertising the Doctoral Scholarships and Post-Doc Fellowships at NUS Law

Email from the Vice Dean (Research)

Dear All,

 

Sorry for the group email, but I just wanted to draw to your attention the Doctoral Scholarships and Post-Doc Fellowships in law that we are offering for the next academic year. Soft copies are attached and the links are below. Don’t be bothered to pass this info on to your relevant Vice/Associate/Assistant Deans, as our research office will be emailing them separately. I provide this information just in case you know of particular students for whom these might be good opportunities.

 

(a)           Post-Doctoral Fellowship

 

This fellowship is available to those who have been awarded (or expect to be awarded) a PhD degree in law (or equivalent) in the period 1 January 2015 to 30 April 2017.

 

The Post-Doctoral Fellowship Announcement and Application form are available at:  http://law.nus.edu.sg/about_us/news/2016/Post-Doctoral_Fellows_AY2017-18.pdf

 

(b)            Doctoral Research Scholarships

 

The scholarships are directed at graduate students who have completed a good  Bachelor’s or first degree in Law (LLB/BA/JD); or a good Master’s degree in Law (LLM/BCL/MJur/MPhil) with a relevant Bachelor’s Degree; or relevant equivalent qualifications or who expect to complete by the summer of 2017.

 

The Doctoral Research Scholarship details and Application form are available at:

http://law.nus.edu.sg/research_publications/pdfs/Doctoral_Research_Scholarships.pdf

 

Very best wishes,

James

 

J E Penner Professor of Law, Vice Dean (Research) Faculty of Law :: National University of Singapore :: Eu Tong Sen Building, 469G Bukit Timah Road, Singapore 259776 :: 65-6601 3460 (DID) :: lawjep@nus.edu.sg (E) :: www.law.nus.edu.sg (W):: Company Registration No: 200604346E

Important: This email is confidential and may be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please delete it and notify us immediately; you should not copy or use it for any purpose, nor disclose its contents to any other person. Thank you.

FMPRC Statement on the Jurisdiction Issues in the South China Sea case
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1310474.shtml

Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China on the Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility of the South China Sea Arbitration by the Arbitral Tribunal Established at the Request of the Republic of the Philippines

2015/10/30

The award rendered on 29 October 2015 by the Arbitral Tribunal established at the request of the Republic of the Philippines (hereinafter referred to as the “Arbitral Tribunal”) on jurisdiction and admissibility of the South China Sea arbitration is null and void, and has no binding effect on China.

I. China has indisputable sovereignty over the South China Sea Islands and the adjacent waters. China’s sovereignty and relevant rights in the South China Sea, formed in the long historical course, are upheld by successive Chinese governments, reaffirmed by China’s domestic laws on many occasions, and protected under international law including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). With regard to the issues of territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, China will not accept any solution imposed on it or any unilateral resort to a third-party dispute settlement.

II. The Philippines’ unilateral initiation and obstinate pushing forward of the South China Sea arbitration by abusing the compulsory procedures for dispute settlement under the UNCLOS is a political provocation under the cloak of law. It is in essence not an effort to settle disputes but an attempt to negate China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests in the South China Sea. In the Position Paper of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Matter of Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines, which was released by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 7 December 2014 upon authorization, the Chinese government pointed out that the Arbitral Tribunal manifestly has no jurisdiction over the arbitration initiated by the Philippines, and elaborated on the legal grounds for China’s non-acceptance of and non-participation in the arbitration. This position is clear and explicit, and will not change.

III. As a sovereign state and a State Party to the UNCLOS, China is entitled to choose the means and procedures of dispute settlement of its own will. China has all along been committed to resolving disputes with its neighbors over territory and maritime jurisdiction through negotiations and consultations. Since the 1990s, China and the Philippines have repeatedly reaffirmed in bilateral documents that they shall resolve relevant disputes through negotiations and consultations. TheDeclaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) explicitly states that the sovereign states directly concerned undertake to resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means through friendly consultations and negotiations. All these documents demonstrate that China and the Philippines have chosen, long time ago, to settle their disputes in the South China Sea through negotiations and consultations. The breach of this consensus by the Philippines damages the basis of mutual trust between states.

IV. Disregarding that the essence of this arbitration case is territorial sovereignty and maritime delimitation and related matters, maliciously evading the declaration on optional exceptions made by China in 2006 under Article 298 of the UNCLOS, and negating the consensus between China and the Philippines on resolving relevant disputes through negotiations and consultations, the Philippines and the Arbitral Tribunal have abused relevant procedures and obstinately forced ahead with the arbitration, and as a result, have severely violated the legitimate rights that China enjoys as a State Party to the UNCLOS, completely deviated from the purposes and objectives of the UNCLOS, and eroded the integrity and authority of the UNCLOS. As a State Party to the UNCLOS, China firmly opposes the acts of abusing the compulsory procedures for dispute settlement under the UNCLOS, and calls upon all parties concerned to work together to safeguard the integrity and authority of the UNCLOS.

V. The Philippines’ attempt to negate China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests in the South China Sea through arbitral proceeding will lead to nothing. China urges the Philippines to honor its own commitments, respect China’s rights under international law, change its course and return to the right track of resolving relevant disputes in the South China Sea through negotiations and consultations.

最高法院指导性案例:马乐内幕信息交易案

指导案例61号

马乐利用未公开信息交易案

(最高人民法院审判委员会讨论通过2016年6月30日发布)

关键词刑事/利用未公开信息交易罪/援引法定刑/情节特别严重

  裁判要点

  刑法第一百八十条第四款规定的利用未公开信息交易罪援引法定刑的情形,应当是对第一款内幕交易、泄露内幕信息罪全部法定刑的引用,即利用未公开信息交易罪应有“情节严重”“情节特别严重”两种情形和两个量刑档次。

  相关法条

  《中华人民共和国刑法》第180条

  基本案情

  2011年3月9日至2013年5月30日期间,被告人马乐担任博时基金管理有限公司旗下的博时精选股票证券投资经理,全权负责投资基金投资股票市场,掌握了博时精选股票证券投资基金交易的标的股票、交易时间和交易数量等未公开信息。马乐在任职期间利用其掌控的上述未公开信息,从事与该信息相关的证券交易活动,操作自己控制的“金某”“严某甲”“严某乙”三个股票账户,通过临时购买的不记名神州行电话卡下单,先于(1-5个交易日)、同期或稍晚于(1-2个交易日)其管理的“博时精选”基金账户买卖相同股票76只,累计成交金额10.5亿余元,非法获利18833374.74元。2013年7月17日,马乐主动到深圳市公安局投案,且到案之后能如实供述其所犯罪行,属自首;马乐认罪态度良好,违法所得能从扣押、冻结的财产中全额返还,判处的罚金亦能全额缴纳。

  裁判结果

  广东省深圳市中级人民法院(2014)深中法刑二初字第27号刑事判决认为,被告人马乐的行为已构成利用未公开信息交易罪。但刑法中并未对利用未公开信息交易罪规定“情节特别严重”的情形,因此只能认定马乐的行为属于“情节严重”。马乐自首,依法可以从轻处罚;马乐认罪态度良好,违法所得能全额返还,罚金亦能全额缴纳,确有悔罪表现;另经深圳市福田区司法局社区矫正和安置帮教科调查评估,对马乐宣告缓刑对其所居住的社区没有重大不良影响,符合适用缓刑的条件。遂以利用未公开信息交易罪判处马乐有期徒刑三年,缓刑五年,并处罚金人民币1884万元;违法所得人民币18833374.74元依法予以追缴,上缴国库。

  宣判后,深圳市人民检察院提出抗诉认为,被告人马乐的行为应认定为犯罪情节特别严重,依照“情节特别严重”的量刑档次处罚。一审判决适用法律错误,量刑明显不当,应当依法改判。

  广东省高级人民法院(2014)粤高法刑二终字第137号刑事裁定认为,刑法第一百八十条第四款规定,利用未公开信息交易,情节严重的,依照第一款的规定处罚,该条款并未对利用未公开信息交易罪规定有“情节特别严重”情形;而根据第一百八十条第一款的规定,情节严重的,处五年以下有期徒刑或者拘役,并处或者单处违法所得一倍以上五倍以下罚金,故马乐利用未公开信息交易,属于犯罪情节严重,应在该量刑幅度内判处刑罚。原审判决量刑适当,抗诉机关的抗诉理由不成立,不予采纳。遂裁定驳回抗诉,维持原判。

  二审裁定生效后,广东省人民检察院提请最高人民检察院按照审判监督程序向最高人民法院提出抗诉。最高人民检察院抗诉提出,刑法第一百八十条第四款属于援引法定刑的情形,应当引用第一款处罚的全部规定;利用未公开信息交易罪与内幕交易、泄露内幕信息罪的违法与责任程度相当,法定刑亦应相当;马乐的行为应当认定为犯罪情节特别严重,对其适用缓刑明显不当。本案终审裁定以刑法第一百八十条第四款未对利用未公开信息交易罪规定有“情节特别严重”为由,降格评价马乐的犯罪行为,属于适用法律确有错误,导致量刑不当,应当依法纠正。

  最高人民法院依法组成合议庭对该案直接进行再审,并公开开庭审理了本案。再审查明的事实与原审基本相同,原审认定被告人马乐非法获利数额为18833374.74元存在计算错误,实际为19120246.98元,依法应当予以更正。最高人民法院(2015)刑抗字第1号刑事判决认为,原审被告人马乐的行为已构成利用未公开信息交易罪。马乐利用未公开信息交易股票76只,累计成交额10.5亿余元,非法获利1912万余元,属于情节特别严重。鉴于马乐具有主动从境外回国投案自首法定从轻、减刑处罚情节;在未受控制的情况下,将股票兑成现金存在涉案三个账户中并主动向中国证券监督管理委员会说明情况,退还了全部违法所得,认罪悔罪态度好,赃款未挥霍,原判罚金刑得已全部履行等酌定从轻处罚情节,对马乐可予减轻处罚。第一审判决、第二审裁定认定事实清楚,证据确实、充分,定罪准确,但因对法律条文理解错误,导致量刑不当,应予纠正。依照《中华人民共和国刑法》第一百八十条第四款、第一款、第六十七条第一款、第五十二条、第五十三条、第六十四条及《最高人民法院关于适用〈中华人民共和国刑事诉讼法〉的解释》第三百八十九条第(三)项的规定,判决如下:一、维持广东省高级人民法院(2014)粤高法刑二终字第137号刑事裁定和深圳市中级人民法院(2014)深中法刑二初字第27号刑事判决中对原审被告人马乐的定罪部分;二、撤销广东省高级人民法院(2014)粤高法刑二终字第137号刑事裁定和深圳市中级人民法院(2014)深中法刑二初字第27号刑事判决中对原审被告人马乐的量刑及追缴违法所得部分;三、原审被告人马乐犯利用未公开信息交易罪,判处有期徒刑三年,并处罚金人民币1913万元;四、违法所得人民币19120246.98元依法予以追缴,上缴国库。

  裁判理由

  法院生效裁判认为:本案事实清楚,定罪准确,争议的焦点在于如何正确理解刑法第一百八十条第四款对于第一款的援引以及如何把握利用未公开信息交易罪“情节特别严重”的认定标准。

  一、对刑法第一百八十条第四款援引第一款量刑情节的理解和把握

  刑法第一百八十条第一款对内幕交易、泄露内幕信息罪规定为:“证券、期货交易内幕信息的知情人员或者非法获取证券、期货交易内幕信息的人员,在涉及证券的发行,证券、期货交易或者其他对证券、期货交易价格有重大影响的信息尚未公开前,买入或者卖出该证券,或者从事与该内幕信息有关的期货交易,或者泄露该信息,或者明示、暗示他人从事上述交易活动,情节严重的,处五年以下有期徒刑或者拘役,并处或者单处违法所得一倍以上五倍以下罚金;情节特别严重的,处五年以上十年以下有期徒刑,并处违法所得一倍以上五倍以下罚金。”第四款对利用未公开信息交易罪规定为:“证券交易所、期货交易所、证券公司、期货经济公司、基金管理公司、商业银行、保险公司等金融机构的从业人员以及有关监管部门或者行业协会的工作人员,利用因职务便利获取的内幕信息以外的其他未公开的信息,违反规定,从事与该信息相关的证券、期货交易活动,或者明示、暗示他人从事相关交易活动,情节严重的,依照第一款的规定处罚。”

  对于第四款中“情节严重的,依照第一款的规定处罚”应如何理解,在司法实践中存在不同的认识。一种观点认为,第四款中只规定了“情节严重”的情形,而未规定“情节特别严重”的情形,因此,这里的“情节严重的,依照第一款的规定处罚”只能是依照第一款中“情节严重”的量刑档次予以处罚;另一种观点认为,第四款中的“情节严重”只是入罪条款,即达到了情节严重以上的情形,依据第一款的规定处罚。至于具体处罚,应看符合第一款中的“情节严重”还是“情节特别严重”的情形,分别情况依法判处。情节严重的,“处五年以下有期徒刑”,情节特别严重的,“处五年以上十年以下有期徒刑”。

  最高人民法院认为,刑法第一百八十条第四款援引法定刑的情形,应当是对第一款全部法定刑的引用,即利用未公开信息交易罪应有“情节严重”“情节特别严重”两种情形和两个量刑档次。这样理解的具体理由如下:

  (一)符合刑法的立法目的。由于我国基金、证券、期货等领域中,利用未公开信息交易行为比较多发,行为人利用公众投入的巨额资金作后盾,以提前买入或者提前卖出的手段获得巨额非法利益,将风险与损失转嫁到其他投资者,不仅对其任职单位的财产利益造成损害,而且严重破坏了公开、公正、公平的证券市场原则,严重损害客户投资者或处于信息弱势的散户利益,严重损害金融行业信誉,影响投资者对金融机构的信任,进而对资产管理和基金、证券、期货市场的健康发展产生严重影响。为此,《中华人民共和国刑法修正案(七)》新增利用未公开信息交易罪,并将该罪与内幕交易、泄露内幕信息罪规定在同一法条中,说明两罪的违法与责任程度相当。利用未公开信息交易罪也应当适用“情节特别严重”。

  (二)符合法条的文意。首先,刑法第一百八十条第四款中的“情节严重”是入罪条款。《最高人民检察院、公安部关于公安机关管辖的刑事案件立案追诉标准的规定(二)》,对利用未公开信息交易罪规定了追诉的情节标准,说明该罪需达到“情节严重”才能被追诉。利用未公开信息交易罪属情节犯,立法要明确其情节犯属性,就必须借助“情节严重”的表述,以避免“情节不严重”的行为入罪。其次,该款中“情节严重”并不兼具量刑条款的性质。刑法条文中大量存在“情节严重”兼具定罪条款及量刑条款性质的情形,但无一例外均在其后列明了具体的法定刑。刑法第一百八十条第四款中“情节严重”之后,并未列明具体的法定刑,而是参照内幕交易、泄露内幕信息罪的法定刑。因此,本款中的“情节严重”仅具有定罪条款的性质,而不具有量刑条款的性质。

  (三)符合援引法定刑立法技术的理解。援引法定刑是指对某一犯罪并不规定独立的法定刑,而是援引其他犯罪的法定刑作为该犯罪的法定刑。刑法第一百八十条第四款援引法定刑的目的是为了避免法条文字表述重复,并不属于法律规定不明确的情形。

  综上,刑法第一百八十条第四款虽然没有明确表述“情节特别严重”,但是根据本条款设立的立法目的、法条文意及立法技术,应当包含“情节特别严重”的情形和量刑档次。

  二、利用未公开信息交易罪“情节特别严重”的认定标准

  目前虽然没有关于利用未公开信息交易罪“情节特别严重”认定标准的专门规定,但鉴于刑法规定利用未公开信息交易罪是参照内幕交易、泄露内幕信息罪的规定处罚,最高人民法院、最高人民检察院《关于办理内幕交易、泄露内幕信息刑事案件具体应用法律若干问题的解释》将成交额250万元以上、获利75万元以上等情形认定为内幕交易、泄露内幕信息罪“情节特别严重”的标准,利用未公开信息交易罪也应当遵循相同的标准。马乐利用未公开信息进行交易活动,累计成交额达10.5亿余元,非法获利达1912万余元,已远远超过上述标准,且在案发时属全国查获的该类犯罪数额最大者,参照最高人民法院、最高人民检察院《关于办理内幕交易、泄露内幕信息刑事案件具体应用法律若干问题的解释》,马乐的犯罪情节应当属于“情节特别严重”。

  (生效裁判审判人员:罗智勇、董朝阳、李剑弢)

http://www.court.gov.cn/fabu-xiangqing-23101.html

万科之争折射股权结构隐患

万科之争折射股权结构隐患

2016年07月20日 07:39    来源: 法治周末    

  苗壮

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  万科控制权之争已经持续了一年之久。随着事态的发展,人们普遍注意到:万科创始人及其管理团队始终未从制度上解决控制权问题,阿里巴巴、京东等民营企业则通过在美国上市,采用“ AB 股”之类双层股权结构在一定程度上解决了这个问题。那么,什么是公司最优的股权结构?我国是否应当允许其采用投票权不平等的股权结构?

  上述问题与公司的治理和收购密切相关,有必要联系其对后者的影响,从法律与经济相结合的角度分析不同类型股权结构的利弊得失。

  股权持有的分散与集中

  大体来说,上市公司主要有三种股权结构:高度分散型、高度集中型以及相对集中或相对分散型。

  高度分散型股权结构的特点是,股权分散在众多小股东手中,没有大股东,更没有控股股东。在这种股权结构下,小股东往往缺少参与治理的动机或能力,股东之间存在着严重的“集体行动难题” ( 也就是人们通常所说的“三个和尚没水吃” ) 。因此,实际控制权往往掌握在管理层手中,最有可能成为敌意收购的对象。在公司治理方面,问题主要在于管理层的代理问题,亦即“内部人控制”问题,包括“懒惰”“好吃懒做”与“贪婪、损公肥私”。相应地,法律层面更为关注管理层的信托责任,包括勤勉责任与忠诚责任。

  高度集中型股权结构的特点是,股权集中在一个大股东或控股股东手中 ( “一股独大” ) 。在这种股权结构下,大股东或控股股东通常具有充分的动机和能力参与治理,有效地克服了上述集体行动难题。因此,实际控制权通常掌握在大股东或控股股东手中,基本上不可能成为敌意收购的对象。在公司治理方面,问题主要在于控股股东的代理问题,亦即“大股东控制”问题,如侵占挪用、同业竞争、关联交易、内幕交易等“利益输送”。相应地,法律层面更为关注控股股东的信托责任,主要是忠诚责任。

  相对集中或相对分散型股权结构的特点是:股权相对集中在少数大股东手中但没有控股股东。大股东有可能是机构投资者或个人投资者,也有可能是战略投资者或财务投资者,还有可能是“外部”投资者或“内部”投资者 ( 包括管理层和员工 ) 。在这种股权结构下,大股东通常具有足够的动机和能力参与治理,基本上克服了上述集体行动难题。因此,公司的实际控制权通常由大股东与管理层分享,敌意收购的难度较大。从公司治理的角度来说,这是一种更为均衡的股权结构:大股东之间,大股东与管理层之间相互制约,相互平衡,更有利于解决管理层与大股东的代理问题。在一定程度上,小股东可以“坐享其成”。

  万科的股权结构经历了从高度分散型到相对集中或相对分散型的转变。宝能收购之前,万科只有两个大股东:华润与管理层,分别持有 15% 与 4% 左右的股份。这种股权结构的特点是,大股东数量不够多,股权集中度不够高,股权结构不够均衡。为此,似有必要及时引进更多大股东,以进一步增强控制权的稳定性。就反敌意收购而言,这相当于一种防范措施,即事先引进一批认同公司经营理念的“白衣绅士”。在这个问题上,管理层对国有企业以及第一大股东的特殊偏好似乎无济于事。上述分析同样适用于国有企业。在“混合所有制”改革中,除了需要绝对控制的企业外,也可以采用上述相对集中或相对分散的股权结构。

  平等与不平等的投票权

  在公司治理中,股东是公司的“所有者”,通过股东大会参与公司重大决策,包括选举董事、监事,批准重要议案。股东大会选举产生的董事会、监事会则代表股东分别行使公司决策权与监督权,包括任命高级管理人员。无论是股东大会还是董事会、监事会,一般都实行多数决定。因此,一般来说,谁能取得多数股份,谁就掌握控制权。

  上述结论的前提是:首先,在公司的“利益相关方”中,只有股东享有投票权 ( “股东投票” ) 。其次,在含有投票权的普通股中,每股只有一个投票权。后者就是人们通常所说的投票权平等原则 ( “一股一票” ) 。传统上,股东投票与一股一票是最终决策权分配的基本原则。

  今天,在美国等一些国家,上述原则发生了不同程度的改变。就后者而言,根据美国现行公司法,公司可以发行含有不同投票权的两类“普通股”:一类每股仍然只有一票,主要由“外部”投资者持有;另一类每股则可以有许多票,主要由包括创始人在内的“内部”管理层持有。这就是人们通常所说的“ AB 股”或“双层股权结构”。

  在上述股权结构下,管理层持有较少股份就能掌握实际控制权并防范敌意收购。一些民营企业之所以选择在美国上市,很有可能与上述考虑有关。问题在于,这也有可能造成内部人控制问题,并干扰“公司控制权市场”的正常运行及其对公司治理以及资源配置的改进作用。众所周知,包括敌意收购在内的公司收购是对管理层的有效外部制约机制。因此,投票权不平等的股权结构在全球范围内引起广泛争议。

  正方的主要依据是合同自由与公司自治原则。公司是“一系列合同的联结”,包括调整股东、董事、监事以及高级管理人员之间关系的公司章程及其他内部文件。一般来说,只要不存在欺诈、胁迫、恶意串通、违法违规等,当事人之间自愿达成的协议不但于当事人有益,而且于第三方无害。因此,应当允许当事人自由地选择或改变公司的股权结构。

  反方的主要依据是剩余控制权与剩余索取权相匹配原则。由于环境复杂的多变性与人类理性的有限性,“公司合同”是不完全的,需要对未尽事项作出决定。上述最终决策权属于“剩余控制权”。由于未来的不确定性,决策是有风险的。激励和约束决策者行为,最有效的办法是使其承担决策的后果。股东享有净收入与净资产分配权,上述最终分配权属于“剩余索取权”。因此,股东是公司经营风险的最终承担者,应当依持股比例将投票权配置给股东。

  实务上,大多数国家都不允许公司采用投票权不平等的股权结构。即使在美国,一股一票仍然是公司法的“默认规则”,大多数公司也仍然采用一股一票的股权结构。

  至于我国是否应当允许公司采用投票权不平等的股权结构,需要从我国公司的治理与收购、资本市场以及商业文化等领域的实际出发,针对其特点和问题,全面分析其利弊得失。应当看到,在上述各个领域,我国仍处于发展的“初级阶段”。与发达国家相比,我国在投资者权益,特别是中小投资者权益保护等方面还存在着一定的差距。上述股权结构即使在美国可行,在中国未必可行。

  ( 作者系清华大学法学院特聘教授、中国商法学研究会理事,历任西门子中国首席律师、拉法基中国法务副总裁等职,并著有《美国公司法》 )

http://finance.ifeng.com/stock/special/wkzdz/

ChemChina’s takeover of Syngenta

August 22, 2016 7:21 am

ChemChina clears hurdle in $44bn takeover of Syngenta

People take an elevator outside the headquarters of China National Chemical Corporation in Beijing...People take an elevator outside the headquarters of China National Chemical Corporation in Beijing, February 4, 2005. China National Chemical Corporation (ChemChina) agreed on March 22, 2015 to buy tyre maker Pirelli in a 7.1 billion euro ($7.7 billion) deal that will place one of the symbols of Italy's manufacturing industry in Chinese hands. Picture taken February 4, 2005. REUTERS/Stringer - RTR4UFNQ©Reuters

Shares in Syngenta jumped 11 per cent on Monday after a US committee scrutinising national security concerns approved ChemChina’s $44bn takeover of the Swiss agribusiness.

The two companies said on Monday they had received clearance from the US Committee on Foreign Investment for the deal, which was first announced in February, clearing a significant hurdle for the takeover.

Investors had seen US worries about the potential national security concerns in a strategically important sector as the main obstacle to execution of the transaction — leading to Syngenta’s shares trading at a significant discount to the offer price.

ChemChina’s bid for Syngenta, a Basel-based company that employs 28,000 people in more than 90 countries, is part of a wave of overseas acquisitions by Chinese companies searching for high quality corporate and real estate assets.

ChemChina’s acquisition of Syngenta would be China’s biggest outbound transaction.

In February, Michel Demaré, Syngenta chairman, said he was “convinced there was no security issue to be concerned about”. However, a month later Chuck Grassley, the US Republican who chairs the Senate Judiciary Committee, warned he was concerned that ChemChina’s bid would give Beijing ownership of a vital part of the US’s agricultural infrastructure.

“Because the food and agriculture sectors are part of the nation’s critical infrastructure this merger raises questions about the potential national security implications,” the veteran senator told an Iowa radio station.

CFIUS has the power to review and block any transaction that may concern US national security.

ChemChina offered to acquire Syngenta at $465 per share plus a special dividend of SFr5. However, investor scepticism over completion of the deal kept the Swiss company’s share price significantly below that level; on Friday the shares were trading at SFr380.80 ($395).

Syngenta’s shares rose 11.3 per cent to SFr423.80 in early Monday trading.

Monday’s announcement takes state-owned ChemChina closer to completion on schedule by the end of the year, although Monday’s statement said this remained “subject to antitrust review by numerous regulators around the world and other customary closing conditions”.

“Both companies are working closely with the regulatory agencies involved and discussions remain constructive,” the statement added.

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Delisting

 

“上市难”必然导致“退市更难”

2016年08月22日 11:39 来源于 财新网

  【财新网】(专栏作家 董登新)总有人误以为,要推行注册制,必须首先改革退市制度,这是一种因果颠倒、本末倒置的看法。事实上,垃圾股死不退市的原因就是核准制。因为“上市难”,所以“退市更难”。因此,要想退市制度发挥功效,就必须首先实现IPO注册制。换句话说,没有注册制,退市制度就只能是摆设。二者的逻辑关系无法改变、也不可能颠倒。

NASDAQ作为世界上最成功的创业板,我们曾经看到如此壮观的景象:20世纪90年代中期之前,NASDAQ每年IPO的家数可达500至700家,同时每年退市家数可达300至500家,1996年底,NASDAQ上市公司总数约为5600家。然而,此后,NASDAQ每年退市多达500至700家,而每年IPO则降为300至500家,结果导致NASDAQ上市公司总数出现了下降,曾经一度不足3000家。这就是NASDAQ的“大进大出”的生命力,这是大浪淘沙的博大胸怀与摧枯拉朽!不仅如此,NASDAQ还构建了“亏损上市”的IPO机制,鼓励新业态、新技术发展壮大,它的大气与包容创造了历史,并培育出了一批世界级的伟大企业,例如微软、苹果、因特尔、百度、新浪、搜狐等。

再看中国创业板,2009年创设,至今走过7个年头,其上市公司总数才达到500家,创业板总市值占中国股市总市值的比重仅有10%!它远无法满足中国股民偏好炒小、炒新的巨大需求,在供求关系严重扭曲的背景下,即便大熊市平均市盈率也能高达100倍,目前仍接近80倍。创业板股价普遍严重高估值,至今更没有一家公司退市,这就是中国股市的“上市难、退市更难”的最真实写照!中国股民最爱打新、炒新,却又十分害怕新股扩容,这就是核准制的扭曲。

其实,中国A股退市制度在设计理念和方法上,已经十分先进,比方,市场化程度最高的“1元退市标准”、成交量退市标准,以及防止利润操纵的总资产退市标准、净资产退市标准都已纳入A股退市制度,然而,为什么如此先进的退市制度仍成摆设?为什么垃圾股总是死不退市?因为我们没有注册制,只有行政审批的核准制。

实际上,退市制度是寄生在发审制度上的一个联体婴儿,二者不能分割。因为“上市难”,所以“退市更难”,这是因果关系、无法颠倒。A股现行IPO核准制的实质是行政审批制,它是指令性计划管制,是过度行政干预,也是“饥饿式”计划配给制,因此,企业要想拿到IPO批文和指标,确实比登天还难,因为IPO排长队有的要长达两、三年,这是最大的时间成本和不确定性,由于“好中选好、优中选优”的选美机制,再加上行政审批,成功过会的风险更大,这就是IPO的惊魂一跃!一旦成功过会,企业身价百倍,当然,它也会带来IPO身价百倍,因为我们的核准制让IPO成为了一种极其稀缺的珍贵资源,它让企业可以不择手段地去公关争夺,这样,就会有巨大的圈钱机会,当然,这也为监管者留下了权力寻租空间!

尤其是对于企业而言,一旦IPO成功,也就万事大吉。这与成熟市场的情形完全相反,比方,在美国股市,IPO很容易,然而一旦IPO后就会十分难受,因为政府监管、市场监督太严厉,它让许多中资企业倍感压力和不安,因此,不少中资概念股最后选择回国或私有化,甚至主动退市。这就是两类IPO体制下的两重天!因为中国企业将IPO看作是“毕业典礼”,而成熟市场的企业却将IPO看作是“开学典礼”。

既然A股IPO如此艰难、成本高昂、风险巨大,那么,与其排队两、三年,将时间和金钱都赔给了时间和券商,倒不如到二级市场寻找一个肮脏的“壳”公司,只要振臂一呼、股民就会奋勇参与共同炒壳重组,结果就是皮包公司买壳上市、股民买单的不归路。这样的曲线上市,谁也管不着,谁也不用求,只要率领股民共赴垃圾股赌博,就有可能操作成功、一夜暴富!这样的A股市场,还哪有什么垃圾股退市?因为垃圾股都成为了皮包公司的抢手货、股民的香饽饽!于是全民流行暴炒垃圾股,一起参赌破产保壳重组游戏,享受赌博的过程,或许还能实现发财梦,何乐而不为?这也是人生的一种刺激体验。

其实,有什么样的制度和市场,就一定会有什么样的投资者。核准制就是不让投资者独立判断、自担风险,而是由监管者辛苦代劳或越俎代庖,美其名曰:保护中小投资者。在核准制下,一些发行人为了拿到IPO批文,甚至甘冒犯罪风险,与保荐人、承销商合谋,不择手段包装,甚至信息造假,它们一旦IPO,圈钱到手,也就万事大吉。同样,投资者打新、炒新根本不需要自己判断,闭着眼睛就敢参与,因为所有新股上市都要连拉N个涨停板,有些新股若不能一口气拉升至200元是不会罢休的。这就是糟糕透顶的、行政审批的核准制!

因此,只有IPO注册制,才能拯救A股市场。只有注册制,才能让监管者成为真正的市场监管者,而不再是IPO审批者;只有注册制,才能让股民成为真正的投资者,而不再赌博;只有注册制,才能让发行人与证券中介承担连带的法律责任,并有效威慑证券犯罪与信息造假活动。

只有注册制,才能让IPO身价暴跌,才能让“新股不败”变成“新股破发”;只有注册制,才能让垃圾股的壳资源变得分文不值,因“上市易”导致“退市更易”,“死不退市”变成“高效退市”,并让1元股成为垃圾股的代名词。到那时,A股市场将会是“大进大出”的大格局。在所有退市公司中,将有一半是自动退市或主动退市,而在另一半强制退市中,又将有一半是因为1元退市标准而退市。这就是IPO注册制的未来,这就是A股市场明天的希望:慢牛短熊时代将会到来!

最后说明:监管者与投资者大可不必谈虎色变,似乎一提注册制就会心脏骤停。其实,IPO注册制更适合在市场低位推出。可以断定,IPO注册制落地之日,就是A股市场结束调整、向上攀升之时。注册制实施已无退路,证监会也无其他选项。

作者为武汉科技大学金融证券研究所所长

本文网址: http://opinion.caixin.com/2016-08-22/100980166.html
国企改革:员工持股

 

国企混改,应该期待怎样的员工持股方案

2016年08月22日 09:00 来源于 财新网

  【财新网】(作者 郑志刚)日前国资委、财政部和证监会联合下发了《关于国有控股混合所有制企业开展员工持股试点的意见》(以下简称《试点意见》)。作为国有企业混合所有制改革的重要配套措施,理论和实务界对《试点意见》充满期待。那么,我们应该期待什么样的员工持股方案呢?

首先,员工持股方案应该鼓励持股员工通过适当的公司治理制度安排成为公司真正的“主人翁”。我们知道,员工持股计划与传统绩效工资等薪酬激励相比的优势是将员工的回报与企业的长期发展捆绑起来,使员工更加关注企业长期绩效,避免追求短期利益而损害企业的长期利益。员工在多大程度上可以决定他未来对企业长期绩效的分配很大程度与公司治理制度安排有关。例如,员工持股达到一定比例后是否可以具有推荐董事的权利。特别地,是否允许以累积投票权的方式选举代表自己利益的董事。如果推荐的董事不能保护持股员工的利益,如何罢免并选举新的董事。然而,从目前的方案看,对这一至关重要的问题《试点意见》却语焉不详。特别是,管理层由于往往被上级任命,按照《试点意见》不属于员工持股的对象,而允许持股的员工却没有相应的公司治理制度安排来保障自己的权益,如同把自己的命运交给未必真正关心自己利益的其他人一样。我们看到,对上述公司治理制度缺乏明确表述,不仅有违员工持股计划推出的本意和初衷,而且适得其反。这不能不说是《试点意见》的重要缺憾。

其次,员工持股方案应该鼓励社会资本愿意参与国有企业的混合所有制改革。受到(员工持股计划)充分激励的员工当然是吸引社会资本参与国企混改的原因之一。但毫无疑问,员工持股后将使社会资本陡然间增加了不得不面对的股东,何况这些股东并非普通的财务投资者,而是十分重要的利益相关者。因此,员工持股计划是在已经实行混改后,由代表不同股东利益的董事会根据员工激励现状(例如,董事会经过科学评价认为传统的基薪+与绩效挂钩的绩效薪酬不足以向员工提供充分的激励)的需要推出,还是首先推出员工持股然后再引进社会资本进行混改值得商榷。一个可能的结果是,由于员工持股计划的推行使得很多原来准备进入国企的社会资本望而却步。除非持股员工本身就是国企混改方案设计者心目中理想的混改对象。

第三,员工持股方案标的的重点应该是国企存量部分。众所周知,国企具有吸引力和存在潜在问题的地方主要集中在存量部分。而这次《试点意见》一方面强调增量引入,主张采取“增资扩股和出资新设”方式开展员工持股;另一方面却强调员工持股不是无偿获得,“员工入股应主要以货币出资,并按约定时间及时缴纳”。同时规定,试点企业“不得向持股员工提供垫资、担保、借贷等财务资助”。容易理解,一个需要“出资新设”的项目未必是员工感兴趣的项目;同样重要的是,是否有必要通过员工持股来将并非项目实施人员的员工与公司新投资项目的股东的利益捆绑在一起本身值得怀疑。因为如果员工对某一项目感兴趣,完全可以通过资本市场直接购买类似项目的股票即可。我们同样担心的是,如果上述方案做实,最终可能出现的结局是,员工感兴趣的标的(例如国企存量部分)不允许持股,而允许持股的标的员工却未必感兴趣。这使得员工持股变为国企混改方案设计者“一厢情愿”的事。

第四,员工持股方案应该改善传统薪酬分配方案的激励效果。理论上,员工持股方案既可能成为传统薪酬方案的补充,但也可能成为具有一定替代性的方案。这意味着在推出员工持股方案之前我们需要审慎地评价目前实行的员工薪酬方案。例如,目前的员工薪酬是否已与绩效密切挂钩,是否实现多劳多得,少劳少得和不劳不得? 如果目前差的绩效表现仅仅由于传统激励方案设计不合理和冗员过多,这显然并不能构成就此推行员工持股计划的充足理由。

第五,员工持股方案应该具有合理的退出机制。我国国企改革历史上曾经推出的职工股份合作制就是由于无法合理解决职工持股的退出问题而无疾而终。除了允许激励对象以规定的价格购买公司股票,标准的股权激励计划往往规定,在锁定期结束后,激励对象有权力将股票在市场上出售。员工之所以愿意持有本公司的股票正是看到了分红,特别是锁定期结束后变现的权力。这使得股票具有良好流动性的公众公司成为推行雇员持股计划的主体。《试点意见》规定,“持股员工因辞职、调离、退休、死亡或被解雇等原因离开本公司,应在12个月内将所持股份进行内部转让;转让给持股平台、符合条件的员工或非公有资本股东的,转让价格由双方协商确定”。同时规定,“转让价格不得高于上一年度经审计的每股净资产”。这意味着,持股的员工未来可能会在给定的有限“市场”,以并没有太多议价空间进行股份转让。这使得员工持股对于部分由于外部原因不得不进行工作转换的员工而言变得并没有太多的诱惑力。更加糟糕的是,这一政策的执行甚至会出现一定程度的逆向选择效应:真正有能力的人害怕被绑定而不愿意接受员工持股计划,而接受员工持股计划的往往是能力不强的人。

刚刚出台的《试点意见》由于上述以及其他本文没有提及的不尽如人意之处必将饱受争议相信同样在政策制定者的预料之中。我们理解,政策制定者之所以在正式政策的出台之前强调必须经过试点阶段,其初衷正是在于在问题大规模暴露之前发现苗头,及时总结经验和教训。希望我们对员工持股计划《试点意见》的上述期待和担忧能够提醒相关政策制定者及时发现问题,推出切实有效可行的员工持股方案来,以扎实推进我国的国有企业混合所有制改革。

作者为盘古智库学术委员、中国人民大学金融学教授

本文网址: http://opinion.caixin.com/2016-08-22/100980071.html
Shenzhen-Hong Kong Stock Connect: Several Reports

The South China Morning Post (SCMP)

 

The Wall Street Journal

China Approves Shenzhen-Hong Kong Stock Link
Stock-trading link’s opening date hasn’t been announced

China’s Shenzhen market, already the world’s seventh-largest, could prove attractive to foreign investors because it is where fast-growing Chinese companies that operate in sectors such as technology, pharmaceuticals and clean energy often list. PHOTO: BLOOMBERG NEWS
By GREGOR STUART HUNTER and CHAO DENG
Updated Aug. 16, 2016 5:42 p.m. ET

SHANGHAI—China is opening the doors to its tech-heavy Shenzhen exchange and scrapping important limits on how much foreigners can invest in the country’s stocks, to entice more global players into its markets.

The moves are a milestone in the decadeslong opening up of China’s financial markets and could mark a return to liberalization after a year in which regulators have tried to clamp down on the country’s notoriously volatile stock trading.

They could help also attract foreign investors, who have avoided Chinese stocks amid a surge in emerging-market investment this year. They could persuade MSCI Inc. to finally add China to its emerging-market indexes, after snubs in the last three years, a step which could see billions of dollars pour into Chinese shares. MSCI declined to comment.

Chinese stock markets—and particularly the Shenzhen exchange—retain a reputation for casinolike behavior. Not all curbs are being lifted. Daily trading inflows into both Shenzhen and Shanghai, China’s other main market, will remain capped at 13 billion yuan ($1.96 billion) a day, and many Shenzhen-listed companies will still be off limits.

Chinese regulators have shown a tendency to reverse course on market changes and crack down on free trading when stocks plunge. The moves to encourage money into Chinese stocks comes as authorities there have been grappling with heavy capital outflows.

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5 Things on the Stock Connect Plan
“It’s just another milestone in terms of reiterating Beijing’s intents on opening China’s markets to international investors,” said Monique France, senior vice president at Mirae Asset Global Investments (USA) LLC. Mirae has invested in China through shares listed in Shanghai and Hong Kong and is likely to add some stocks from Shenzhen once the program begins, she said.
But the $3.2 trillion Shenzhen market, already the world’s seventh largest, could prove attractive to foreign investors because it is where fast-growing Chinese companies that operate in sectors such as technology, pharmaceuticals and clean energy often list. By contrast, Shanghai, which foreign investors can already access via a trading link with Hong Kong, is dominated by less-vibrant state-owned banks and oil companies.

“Shenzhen is widely regarded as being a bit like the Nasdaq in its characteristics,” said Mark Tinker, head of asset manager AXA Framlington Asia. “People looking to participate in the growth of China are looking more keenly to Shenzhen, and if this gives easier access to participate in that market, then it’s going to be regarded as another positive step in the integration of China with the rest of the world.”

The start date for the so-called Shenzhen-Hong Kong Connect is still unclear, although the statement announcing the launch said it should now come by the end of this year.

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“Preparation work for the Shenzhen-Hong Kong Connect is basically done,” China’s State Council, the country’s top policy-making body, said Tuesday.

The move will place some 880 Shenzhen-listed stocks, representing more than $1 trillion in market capitalization, onto the menu of global investors. The ChiNext, a listing board focused on fast-growing startups, will also be opened up, though limited to professional institutional investors.

Regulators also said there would no longer be an upper limit on the total amount of Chinese shares foreigners can hold. Currently, global investors can buy up to 300 billion yuan worth of shares in more than 500 Shanghai companies.

Still, foreign investors used to trading mostly on major Western markets will find plenty of oddities trading in Chinese stocks, including rules that prohibit day-trading of stocks, market holidays that fall on different days on each side of the border, and regulatory restrictions that make it virtually impossible to short stocks.

“I don’t think it’s crucial for people to be invested in Shenzhen at this point, but longer term there will be opportunities,” said Ilya Feygin, managing director at brokerage WallachBeth Capital. “For me, Shenzhen is like the Nasdaq was in the 90s and 80s—it had a few bubbles but risk also represents opportunity.”

When the Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Exchange opened in late 2014, it led to predictions that billions of dollars would flow into shares of companies in China, where growth, while faltering, is still far higher than in most major economies.

But the launch was marred by regulatory and tax issues, and foreign interest was further chilled by the collapse in Shanghai stocks last summer that shook global markets. Beijing’s attempts to stem the slide included introducing a circuit-breaker mechanism at the start of this year. The new system was scrapped after just four trading days when shares continued to slump. The head of China’s market regulator resigned in February.

Such missteps have deepened skepticism about Beijing’s desire to develop truly free markets. Recently, the existing Shanghai-Hong Kong trading link has been used more heavily by Chinese investors wanting to buy shares in Hong Kong.

“Last year’s stock market rout and bungled policy response have hurt overseas demand for mainland stocks—foreigners have been net sellers of Chinese equities in recent months,” Julian Evans-Pritchard, China economist at Capital Economics in London, said in a note.

The Shenzhen market opened in 1990, when the city was spearheading some of the country’s most far-reaching economic overhauls.

Today, trading remains volatile, driven by retail investors and subject to heavy government intervention. Shenzhen lost 50.2% of its value from peak to trough from last June to September, compared with the 45.1% slump in Shanghai stocks during roughly the same period. Both markets are down about 12% year to date.

Investors have been anticipating the opening of the Shenzhen-Hong Kong Connect for nearly two years, since the earlier Shanghai-Hong Kong link started. Traders say the announcement has been delayed because Beijing’s priority has been to stabilize domestic stock markets.

“Considering the number of fires they’ve had to put out this year, it makes sense for authorities to try to do this in a methodical way,” said Bill Bowler, an equities trader at Hong Kong-based Forsyth Barr Asia Ltd.

Among the well-known companies listed in Shenzhen are telecoms equipment manufacturer ZTE Corp.; China Vanke, the country’s biggest residential real-estate developer; and TCL Corp., a consumer electronics company that bought the Palm brand from Hewlett-Packard Co. in 2015.

However, few expect to see an immediate influx into Chinese markets. Many foreign investors have become skeptical of China due to the recent disappointing flow of economic data and lack of structural reforms the government had pledged. As of early August, China-focused stock funds have posted outflows of nine consecutive weeks, making it one of the worst performing emerging markets, according to EPFR Global.

This addition access to the Chinese market “is not going to have any impact on the fundamentals of Chinese companies, which continue to be quite poor,” said Andrey Kutuzov, an associate portfolio manager at Wasatch Advisors, a Utah-based asset manager specialized in emerging markets. He said that earnings growth in China still lags behind markets such as India, Mexico and the Philippines.

But for some investors, the opening up of the Shenzhen market allows them to invest in the parts of a Chinese economy that are set to benefit from slower industrial and manufacturing growth. Nearly three quarters of Shenzhen-listed companies are in the “new economy” sectors, including service and technology, according to David Semple, who runs the $1.1-billion VanEck Emerging Markets fund. “There’re a handful of stocks that we have identified that are interesting,” he said.

—Carolyn Cui, Yifan Xie
and Dominique Fong contributed to this article.

Write to Gregor Stuart Hunter at gregor.hunter@wsj.com and Chao Deng at Chao.Deng@wsj.com

 

5 Things on the Shenzhen-Hong Kong Stock Connect Plan
Stock-trading link will unlock access to a new territory of Chinese tech shares
ENLARGE
The Shenzhen Stock Exchange has 1,790 listed companies, more than the 1,110 listings in Shanghai. PHOTO: BLOOMBERG NEWS
By DOMINIQUE FONG and GREGOR STUART HUNTER
Aug. 16, 2016 7:17 a.m. ET
0 COMMENTS
A stock trading link between Shenzhen and Hong Kong will unlock access to a new territory of Chinese tech stocks that global investors can’t easily get anywhere else.

ENLARGE
The link gives investors another trading channel to the world’s seventh-largest stock market. As of May, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange had a market capitalization of $3.16 trillion, according to the World Federation of Exchanges. That’s a bit larger than Hong Kong’s $3.10 trillion exchange, but smaller than Shanghai’s $3.87 trillion.

Shenzhen has 1,790 listed companies, more than the 1,110 listings in Shanghai. That compares to the 2,330 companies with shares listed on the New York Stock Exchange as of May, according to the WFE.

ENLARGE
Some fund managers are hoping to buy into one of China’s hottest sectors: tech stocks. Nearly a fifth of Shenzhen’s stock market is tech companies, a much bigger proportion than that in Shanghai, where tech stocks make up just 4% of the market.

Chinese officials, such as Premier Li Keqiang, have stated that tech companies’ continued growth will help shift China’s economy from one led by debt-fueled investment spending—that had bolstered “old economy” state-owned companies in sectors such as steel and cement—to one driven by consumption and the burgeoning middle class.

ENLARGE
The Shenzhen Stock Exchange is the second-busiest world-wide, eclipsing even the Nasdaq and Bats Global Markets in the U.S.
In Shenzhen, the value of share trading was $1.2 trillion during July. That compares to the $1.27 trillion exchanging hands on the New York Stock Exchange and $713 billion trading in Shanghai during the month. High volumes mean there is ample liquidity, making it easier for investors to make the trades at the prices they want.

ENLARGE
Shenzhen is also a volatile market, which mirrored the astounding surge and tumble last year in the Shanghai Composite Index.

Retail investors dominate China’s stock markets, unlike more developed exchanges in Hong Kong and the U.S., where institutional investors comprise a much larger proportion of the market. Because long-term investors, such as pension funds, put in large buy and sell orders, they tend to take more time to react to news and are a stabilizing force in markets. Mom and pop investors in China, on the other hand, tend to be more sensitive to speculation, which can cause large swings in mainland stock markets.

The Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect, which is what the Shenzhen trading link is being modeled after, has seen mixed activity from investors on both sides of the mainland China border.

Mainland Chinese investors have been far more active than global investors through the trading link. Since the Stock Connect’s inception in November 2014, mainland Chinese have bought 81.92% of their aggregate quota of 250 billion yuan allowed by Chinese regulators. On the other hand, global investors have used just 50.09% of their total quota of 300 billion yuan.

The relatively lackluster demand by global investors for Chinese stocks listed in Shanghai so far has raised questions about the success of the program, and whether foreign demand for Shenzhen stocks would be any greater.

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Write to Dominique Fong at Dominique.Fong@wsj.com and Gregor Stuart Hunter at gregor.hunter@wsj.com

 

5 Things on the Shenzhen-Hong Kong Stock Connect Plan
Stock-trading link will unlock access to a new territory of Chinese tech shares

The Shenzhen Stock Exchange has 1,790 listed companies, more than the 1,110 listings in Shanghai. PHOTO: BLOOMBERG NEWS
By DOMINIQUE FONG and GREGOR STUART HUNTER
Aug. 16, 2016 7:17 a.m. ET
0 COMMENTS
A stock trading link between Shenzhen and Hong Kong will unlock access to a new territory of Chinese tech stocks that global investors can’t easily get anywhere else.

ENLARGE
The link gives investors another trading channel to the world’s seventh-largest stock market. As of May, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange had a market capitalization of $3.16 trillion, according to the World Federation of Exchanges. That’s a bit larger than Hong Kong’s $3.10 trillion exchange, but smaller than Shanghai’s $3.87 trillion.

Shenzhen has 1,790 listed companies, more than the 1,110 listings in Shanghai. That compares to the 2,330 companies with shares listed on the New York Stock Exchange as of May, according to the WFE.

ENLARGE
Some fund managers are hoping to buy into one of China’s hottest sectors: tech stocks. Nearly a fifth of Shenzhen’s stock market is tech companies, a much bigger proportion than that in Shanghai, where tech stocks make up just 4% of the market.

Chinese officials, such as Premier Li Keqiang, have stated that tech companies’ continued growth will help shift China’s economy from one led by debt-fueled investment spending—that had bolstered “old economy” state-owned companies in sectors such as steel and cement—to one driven by consumption and the burgeoning middle class.

ENLARGE
The Shenzhen Stock Exchange is the second-busiest world-wide, eclipsing even the Nasdaq and Bats Global Markets in the U.S.
In Shenzhen, the value of share trading was $1.2 trillion during July. That compares to the $1.27 trillion exchanging hands on the New York Stock Exchange and $713 billion trading in Shanghai during the month. High volumes mean there is ample liquidity, making it easier for investors to make the trades at the prices they want.

ENLARGE
Shenzhen is also a volatile market, which mirrored the astounding surge and tumble last year in the Shanghai Composite Index.

Retail investors dominate China’s stock markets, unlike more developed exchanges in Hong Kong and the U.S., where institutional investors comprise a much larger proportion of the market. Because long-term investors, such as pension funds, put in large buy and sell orders, they tend to take more time to react to news and are a stabilizing force in markets. Mom and pop investors in China, on the other hand, tend to be more sensitive to speculation, which can cause large swings in mainland stock markets.

The Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect, which is what the Shenzhen trading link is being modeled after, has seen mixed activity from investors on both sides of the mainland China border.

Mainland Chinese investors have been far more active than global investors through the trading link. Since the Stock Connect’s inception in November 2014, mainland Chinese have bought 81.92% of their aggregate quota of 250 billion yuan allowed by Chinese regulators. On the other hand, global investors have used just 50.09% of their total quota of 300 billion yuan.

The relatively lackluster demand by global investors for Chinese stocks listed in Shanghai so far has raised questions about the success of the program, and whether foreign demand for Shenzhen stocks would be any greater.

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Write to Dominique Fong at Dominique.Fong@wsj.com and Gregor Stuart Hunter at gregor.hunter@wsj.com

 

FT:China’s State Council approves Shenzhen-HK market linkup

http://www.ft.com/fastft/2016/08/16/chinas-state-council-approves-shenzhen-hk-market-linkup/

Beijing has just signalled that a long-awaited trading link between Shenzhen stocks and Hong Kong’s market is set to open before the end of the year – roughly two years on from the milestone launch of a link with Shanghai.


The so-called “Connect” will for the first time allow international investors to trade stocks listed in the southern city, home to many more tech and start-up enterprises than Shanghai, which is known for hosting a greater proportion of state-owned enterprises and banks – neither of which are particularly popular with international investors just now.

“Preparatory work related to the Shenzhen-Hong Kong Stock connect is basically completed, and the State Council has approved a ‘Draft Plan for Implementation of the Shenzhen-Hong Kong Stock Connect’,” Premier Li Keqiang said in a statement.

The Shenzhen link has long been expected by the market, with Hong Kong regulators and the exchange saying they are ready. Final testing and preparatory work is expected to take roughly another three months. That would allow the link to open as soon as November.

China economist Chen Long at Gavekal Dragonomics said “appetite will only be gradual” for Shenzhen shares, pointing out that, by his estimate, only half of the Shanghai Connect’s quota had been used in the more than two years since its launch. But he added that investor appetite would be better than it has been for Shanghai because Shenzhen’s small-caps have historically given better returns.

Hao Hong, chief strategist and co-head of research at Bocom International, noted the latest statement was short on key specifics. “Hopefully we’ll see more details in the coming days regarding the quota, daily limits, who can participate, etcetera,” he said.

Mr Hong said the linkup was another significant step in connecting three exchanges from two parts of China, but cautioned that “short term, there could be profit taking based on the news once all the details come out.”

Hong Kong stocks have rallied in recent days in hope that an announcement was imminent. The Shanghai Connect works in both directions, providing mainland investors with their only direct access to an international market as well as allowing foreign money to flow north.

Both southbound and northbound flows are subject to quota caps, but neither requires individual approval of each investor, as previous investor schemes, such as QFII, have.

“[The Shenzhen-Hong Kong connect] has two positives: the first is it shows that this period of worry in Beijing about currency outflows has passed,” said Erwin Sanft, a regional strategist at Macquarie. “But in a more practical way, it opens up increased access to the China market.”

In the official statement Mr Li said the Shanghai-Hong Kong connect had “successfully laid the foundation for the rolling out of the Shenzhen-Hong Kong connect, signifying that China’s capital market has once more taken a substantial step forward in terms of legalisation, marketisation and internationalisation with many positive implications.”

As of market close the Shenzhen Composite Index’s market capitalisation stood at $3.33tn.

(Charts: Macquarie.)

 

Reading on Piercing Corporate Veil in China

Journal of Corporate Law Studies

Volume 15, 2015 – Issue 2

LIFTING THE CORPORATE VEIL IN CHINA: STATUTORY VAGUENESS, SHAREHOLDER IGNORANCE AND CASE PRECEDENTS IN A CIVIL LAW SYSTEM

Page 341-376 | Published online: 24 Jul 2015

This article surveys almost 300 court judgments in which shareholders have been sued for corporate debts under Article 20 of the PRC Company Law. The frequency of ‘veil-lifting’ can indicate how much weight is ascribed in China to fundamental corporate law principles such as limited liability, asset partitioning and the separate legal identity of the corporation. Our survey finds that shareholders were found liable for corporate debts in over 75% of cases, a significantly higher rate of veil-lifting than in jurisdictions elsewhere in the world. We challenge previous scholars’ explanations of this phenomenon. We also argue that statutory vagueness has led to unfair and inconsistent veil-lifting judgments in a number of cases. The current interpretative system of Supreme People’s Court Regulations and Guiding Cases needs modification to ensure that inconsistencies in adjudication are ironed out in a more timely manner.

Asia Pacific Law Review

The High Frequency of Piercing the Corporate Veil in China

Data gathered to date suggests that litigants seeking redress for company obligations from the company’s shareholders are far more likely to succeed in China than in other jurisdictions. This raises the question whether the different success rates are due to different law or different attitudes towards the sanctity of the corporate veil in a former socialist country which knew no private companies for its first three decades, leading to judicial interpretations in favour of creditors that are much broader than the text of the law and its intended scope.
CSR in China

Reading:

 

Research Notes:

  1. What is CSR? People, Planet and Profit.
    1. Provision of reliable, eco-friendly, safe products;
    2. Worker protection and welfare
    3. Corporate philanthropy, charities, and community development.
    4. CSR reports, etc.
  2. Why CSR? the debates.
    1. Nature of business
    2. Cover up
  3. CSR in China: Factors
    1. Growing environmental and safety concerns of the society.
    2. Rise of civil society
    3. Publicity.
    4. Government-driven projects: “For example, the Chinese government announced plans in 2009 to spend billions on tree planting and reforestation. In turn, many companies in China have launched tree-planting initiatives as part of their CSR efforts.”
    5. SOEs to repay the society. “The state-owned enterprise is the leading edge of corporate social responsibility at the moment.”
      1. 2007 SASAC’s Guidelines on Fulfiling Social Responsibility by Centra Enterprises.
    6. Rise of private philanthropy and volunteerism
    7. 2005 Company Law revision.
      1. State Grid was the only Chinese company to file an CSR Report in 2006. In 2012, 1,722 Chinese companies published CSR reports.
  4. Is Codification a Solution?
Two Rankings on Doing Business

The Open for Business Report by U.S. News and World Report

Link: http://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/overall-full-list

Overview

In deciding where to bring their business, companies must define their priorities by weighing multiple operating and human costs. National governments face a similar cost-benefit analysis in setting corporate tax rates and policy. The countries considered the most business friendly are those that perceived to best balance stability and expense.

The Best Countries rankings, conducted in partnership with brand strategy firm BAV Consulting and the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, is based on a survey which asked more than 16,000 people from four regions to associate 60 countries with specific characteristics. The Open for Business subranking is based on an equally weighted average of scores from five country attributes that relate to how open for business a country is: bureaucratic, cheap manufacturing costs, corrupt, favorable tax environment and transparent government practices. The Open for Business subranking score had a 12 percent weight in the overall Best Countries ranking.

The World Bank’s Doing Business Reports

Link: http://www.doingbusiness.org/reports

Doing Business 2016

Measuring Regulatory Quality and Efficiency

Author: Doing Business

Published: October 27, 2015

Also available as mini book (PDF, 2.4MB)

(15460.3 KB PDF)

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Overview

Doing Business 2016: Measuring Regulatory Quality and Efficiency, a World Bank Group flagship publication, is the 13th in a series of annual reports measuring the regulations that enhance business activity and those that constrain it. Doing Business presents quantitative indicators on business regulations and the protection of property rights that can be compared across 189 economies—from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe—and over time.

Doing Business measures regulations affecting 11 areas of the life of a business. Ten of these areas are included in this year’s ranking on the ease of doing business: starting a business, dealing with construction permits, getting electricity, registering property, getting credit, protecting minority investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts and resolving insolvency. Doing Business also measures labor market regulation, which is not included in this year’s ranking.

Data in Doing Business 2016 are current as of June 1, 2015. The indicators are used to analyze economic outcomes and identify what reforms of business regulation have worked, where and why. This year’s Doing Business report continues a two-year process of introducing improvements in 8 of 10 Doing Business indicator sets—to complement the emphasis on the efficiency of regulation with a greater focus on its quality.

Main Findings

  • Doing Business 2016: Measuring Regulatory Quality and Efficiency finds that entrepreneurs in 122 economies saw improvements in their local regulatory framework last year. Between June 2014 and June 2015, the report, which measures 189 economies worldwide, documented 231 business reforms. Among reforms to reduce the complexity and cost of regulatory processes, those in the area of starting a business were the most common in 2014/15, as in the previous year. The next most common were reforms in the areas of paying taxes, getting electricity and registering property. Read about business reforms.
  • Costa Rica, Uganda, Kenya, Cyprus, Mauritania, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, JamaicaSenegal and Benin are among the economies that improved the most in 2014/2015 in areas tracked by Doing Business. Together, these 10 top improvers implemented 39 regulatory reforms making it easier to do business.
  • Sub-Saharan Africa alone accounted for about 30% of the regulatory reforms making it easier to do business in 2014/15, followed closely by Europe and Central Asia. Members of the Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa were particularly active: 14 of the 17 economies implemented business regulation reforms in the past year—29 in total. Twenty-four of these reforms reduced the complexity and cost of regulatory processes, while the other five strengthened legal institutions.
  • This year’s report adds indicators of quality to four indicator sets: registering property, dealing with construction permits, getting electricity and enforcing contracts. In addition, the trading across borders indicators have been revised to increase their relevance. The underlying case study now focuses on the top export product for each economy, on a very common manufactured product (auto parts) as its import product and on its largest trading partner for the export and import products.
  • Seven case studies featured in the report: Five focus on legal and regulatory features covered by new or expanded indicators being introduced this year—in the areas of dealing with construction permits, getting electricity, registering property, trading across borders and enforcing contracts. The other two analyze other areas of interest in the historical data set. See all case studies.
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