Economist: China’s Foreign Policy and International Economic Order

Foreign policy

Our bulldozers, our rules

China’s foreign policy could reshape a good part of the world economy

THE first revival of the Silk Road—a vast and ancient network of trade routes linking China’s merchants with those of Central Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Europe—took place in the seventh century, after war had made it unusable for hundreds of years. Xi Jinping, China’s president, looks back on that era as a golden age, a time of Pax Sinica, when Chinese luxuries were coveted across the globe and the Silk Road was a conduit for diplomacy and economic expansion. The term itself was coined by a German geographer in the 19th century, but China has adopted it with relish. Mr Xi wants a revival of the Silk Road and the glory that went with it.

This time cranes and construction crews are replacing caravans and camels. In April a Chinese shipping company, Cosco, took a 67% stake in Greece’s second-largest port, Piraeus, from which Chinese firms are building a high-speed rail network linking the city to Hungary and eventually Germany. In July work is due to start on the third stage of a Chinese-designed nuclear reactor in Pakistan, where China recently announced it would finance a big new highway and put $2 billion into a coal mine in the Thar desert. In the first five months of this year, more than half of China’s contracts overseas were signed with nations along the Silk Road—a first in the country’s modern history.

Politicians have been almost as busy in the builders’ wake. In June Mr Xi visited Serbia and Poland, scattering projects along the way, before heading to Uzbekistan. Last week Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, made a brief visit to Beijing; he, Mr Xi and Mongolia’s leader promised to link their infrastructure plans with the new Silk Road. At the time, finance ministers from almost 60 countries were holding the first annual meeting in Beijing of an institution set up to finance some of these projects, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Like a steam train pulling noisily out of a station, China’s biggest foreign-economic policy is slowly gathering speed.

Chinese officials call that policy “One Belt, One Road”, though they often eviscerate its exotic appeal to foreigners by using the unlovely acronym OBOR. Confusingly, the road refers to ancient maritime routes between China and Europe, while the belt describes the Silk Road’s better-known trails overland (see map). OBOR puzzles many Western policymakers because it is amorphous—it has no official list of member countries, though the rough count is 60—and because most of the projects that sport the label would probably have been built anyway. But OBOR matters for three big reasons.

First, the projects are vast. Official figures say there are 900 deals under way, worth $890 billion, such as a gas pipeline from the Bay of Bengal through Myanmar to south-west China and a rail link between Beijing and Duisburg, a transport hub in Germany. China says it will invest a cumulative $4 trillion in OBOR countries, though it does not say by when. Its officials tetchily reject comparison with the Marshall Plan which, they say, was a means of rewarding America’s friends and excluding its enemies after the second world war. OBOR, they boast, is open to all. But, for what it is worth, the Marshall Plan amounted to $130 billion in current dollars.

Next, OBOR matters because it is important to Mr Xi. In 2014 the foreign minister, Wang Yi, singled out OBOR as the most important feature of the president’s foreign policy. Mr Xi’s chief foreign adviser, Yang Jiechi, has tied OBOR to China’s much-touted aims of becoming a “moderately well-off society” by 2020 and a “strong, prosperous” one by mid-century.

Mr Xi seems to see the new Silk Road as a way of extending China’s commercial tentacles and soft power. It also plays a role in his broader foreign-policy thinking. The president has endorsed his predecessors’ view that China faces a “period of strategic opportunity” up to 2020, meaning it can take advantage of a mostly benign security environment to achieve its aim of strengthening its global power without causing conflict. OBOR, officials believe, is a good way of packaging such a strategy. It also fits with Mr Xi’s “Chinese dream” of recreating a great past. It is not too much to say that he expects to be judged as a leader partly on how well he fulfils OBOR’s goals.

Third, OBOR matters because it is a challenge to the United States and its traditional way of thinking about world trade. In that view, there are two main trading blocs, the trans-Atlantic one and the trans-Pacific one, with Europe in the first, Asia in the second and America the focal point of each. Two proposed regional trade deals, the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, embody this approach. But OBOR treats Asia and Europe as a single space, and China, not the United States, is its focal point.

Mr Xi first spoke of a new Silk Road during a visit to Kazakhstan in 2013, a year after he took power. The first contracts bearing OBOR’s name—about 300 of them, including a huge hydropower plant in Pakistan—followed in 2014, though many of those deals were already well advanced. The past two years have seen a frenzy of institution-building. Mr Xi has set up a “small leading group” to oversee OBOR. This is an informal high-level body linking government and party organisations. Its boss is Zhang Gaoli, who is a member of the Politburo Standing Committee, the party’s innermost circle. It also includes the leadership’s chief spin doctor and a deputy prime minister responsible for foreign trade. All the main bits of the bureaucracy have been corralled into OBOR.

A financial structure to support it has also taken shape. In 2015 the central bank transferred $82 billion to three state-owned “policy banks” for OBOR projects. China’s sovereign wealth fund backed a new Silk Road Fund worth $40 billion and the government set up the AIIB with $100 billion of initial capital. The bank is not formally part of OBOR but the loans approved at its first general meeting—roads in Pakistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, for example—are all in Silk Road countries.

Now the rest of the Chinese state is mobilising. Two-thirds of China’s provinces have emphasised the importance of OBOR for their development. For example, Fuzhou, the capital of coastal Fujian province, has told its companies to “start businesses in the countries and regions along the maritime Silk Road”; it has set up a free-trade zone to attract firms from such countries in South-East Asia. Many big state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have an OBOR department, if only in the hope of getting money for their projects.

As a result, China’s foreign direct investment (FDI) is increasingly going along the Silk Road. In 2015, by official reckoning, its FDI in OBOR countries rose twice as fast as the increase in total FDI. Last year 44% of China’s new engineering projects were signed with OBOR countries. In the first five months of 2016, the share was 52%.

China’s approach to investment seems to be changing, too. Its OBOR contracts are now more likely to involve Chinese firms managing the infrastructure they build, rather than (as in the past) building them and simply handing them over. In theory, this should give China an interest in working for the long term in Silk Road countries.

Yet while OBOR gathers momentum it is also encountering problems. These are especially glaring in South-East Asia. China is planning a 3,000km (1,900-mile) high-speed rail line from Kunming, in its south-west, to Singapore. But in June talks with Thailand over its section of the line broke down; the Thais said they would build only part of the project, and would finance it themselves. There have been many other such failures.

Also worrying are signs that there are not yet enough viable projects for the vast sums being earmarked. The Silk Road Fund was set up to invest in infrastructure abroad. But two of its first investments were in initial public offerings by Chinese firms in Hong Kong.

Problems have arisen too with OBOR’s leadership. Mr Zhang, the most senior person in charge, is thought to be out of favour after blotting his copybook in March by saying that the economy had had “a tremendous start” to 2016. This contradicted the views of people close to Mr Xi who argue that a slowdown is necessary.

The travails of the European Union—and especially of Britain, which has claimed to be enjoying a “golden age” of relations with China—might make Chinese leaders nervous about Europe’s willingness to support OBOR, though it might also in the long run make it easier for China to exploit rivalry between European countries when doing deals with them.

More broadly, China has many competing bureaucratic interests at stake in the Silk Road project. Reconciling them will be tough. OBOR is supposed to extend Chinese commercial influence, reduce the Chinese economy’s dependence on investment in infrastructure at home and export a little of China’s vast excess capacity in steel and cement. Tensions between these aims are inevitable. Should China give priority to underperforming provinces or underperforming SOEs? Can it help poor western provinces while reducing its spending on domestic infrastructure?

Ready or not, here they come

All that said, there are reasons for thinking the new Silk Road will be paved, albeit not with gold. Most important, Asia needs new infrastructure—about $770 billion a year of it until 2020, according to the Asian Development Bank. This demand should eventually ease today’s worries about a lack of projects. Bert Hofman, the World Bank’s chief in Beijing, adds that individual countries will benefit more if they align their plans with one other and with China. It does not pay to plan and build separately.

Next, China needs OBOR. At home, its businesses are being squeezed by rising costs and growing demands that they pay more attention to protecting the environment. It makes sense for them to shift some manufacturing overseas—as long as the infrastructure is there.

Lastly, Xi Jinping needs it. He has made OBOR such a central part of his foreign policy and has gone to such lengths to swing the bureaucracy behind the project that it is too late to step back now.

None of this means the new Silk Road will be efficient, nor does it mean China’s plans will always be welcome in countries suspicious of its expanding reach. But the building blocks are in place. The first projects are up and running. OBOR is already beginning to challenge the notion of Europe and Asia existing side by side as different trading blocs.

Two Economist Reports on FIE Law in China

Business in China

Mixed messages

A missed opportunity to improve the environment for foreign companies in China

LI KEQIANG, China’s prime minister, made a big promise to the world’s leading businessmen at the World Economic Forum’s annual gathering in Davos in January 2015. It was that China would introduce a new legal regime for foreign investment that would “treat Chinese and foreign companies as equals”. Its government has duly unveiled a set of revisions to its foreign-investment laws that come into force on October 1st. The standing committee of the National People’s Congress adopted the laws earlier this month and bureaucrats have drafted detailed rules.

The revisions, and the extent to which they fulfil Mr Li’s grand pledge, are an important indicator of how serious the government is about pursuing other initiatives to liberalise rules on foreign investment. China is currently negotiating a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) with the United States. American businesses hope it will lead to greater market access. A BIT with Europe is scheduled to follow.

How, then, do the changes measure up? On the face of it, they involve a welcome shift away from the current regime, which obliges foreign firms to win numerous approvals and is both burdensome and often influenced by domestic politics. The new framework pursues efficiency. Instead of demanding approvals, it seeks to usher in a simpler, registration-based system. Whereas the current approach is based on a long list of strategic industries in which foreign investment is either restricted or off-limits, the overhaul promises to replace it with a relatively short “negative list” of forbidden investments in areas such as defence and media. According to some, such as Hogan Lovells, a law firm, the reforms herald a sea-change in China’s foreign direct investment (FDI) regime.

Yet the revisions leave intact much that is wrong. China has kept a complex set of rules restricting inflows for decades. As well as the long-standing practice of deeming many industries strategic, the government still requires foreign firms to form joint ventures with Chinese companies and to hand over intellectual property via technology transfers. Repatriation of profits is tightly controlled. And because the approvals-based approach is likely to persist, despite official promises, every foreign investment is subject to the vagaries and corruption that comes with a one-party, highly bureaucratic state.

Most glaringly, there is nothing in the new changes that genuinely places foreign firms on an equal legal footing with local ones. The EU Chamber of Commerce in China dismissed the new reforms as “not bold enough”. It issued a thinly veiled warning that the EU may make it harder for Chinese to invest in Europe.

Another big omission is the government’s failure to tackle the problem of offshore legal structures known as variable interest entities (VIEs). Foreign investment is banned in Chinese internet companies, but by getting foreigners to put money into VIEs to which the Chinese firm promises to pay dividends, many firms have got around this ban. A proper reform would have ended the ambiguity surrounding these vehicles. It was not forthcoming.

The tape is red

There are already signs of bureaucratic resistance even to the government’s modest revisions. It is questionable, for example, whether officials will accept the shift from an approvals-based scheme to a registration system. Bureaucrats at the top economic planning agency, the National Development and Reform Commission, are said to reject the idea that the approvals-based system is coming to an end. They say the new rules are just a modification of the existing approach to foreign investment.

Meanwhile, multinationals are no longer clamouring to put money into China’s slowing economy. FDI has been flooding into the Middle Kingdom for two decades. Inbound direct investment reached a peak of nearly $300 billion in 2013 but has cooled off since. Foreign inflows are slowing just as Chinese outward investments are skyrocketing (see chart). It seems exactly the right moment to roll out the welcome mat, but the changes going into effect fall well short of what multinationals had hoped for. As Jake Parker of the US China Business Council, a lobby group for big American firms, points out, Chinese leaders have talked about lots of reforms but “the lack of implementation has created uncertainty about the policy direction and undermined confidence.”

Foreign firms in China

You’re still welcome

The country’s leaders seek to reassure nervous foreign businesses

THE bosses of foreign firms with operations in China grumble that their lives have got harder of late. China used to be a frontier market offering endless double-digit growth. Officials put out the welcome mat, and were open to wining and dining. Regulators were no more bothersome than in other emerging markets.

Now, growth is slowing: official data released this week confirm that the economy grew by 7.4% last year, the slowest rate in 24 years. A crackdown on official corruption has made it impossible to win friends in government. And antitrust authorities have taken a tough line with foreign carmakers, drugmakers and other firms that had hoped their guanxi (connections) offered them protection. Many foreign bosses are now convinced that the golden age for multinationals in China is over.

That may explain the charm offensive the government launched this week. The prime minister, Li Keqiang, led a delegation of Chinese worthies to the World Economic Forum’s meeting in Davos, Switzerland. He promised the assembled global business elite his country would “treat Chinese and foreign companies as equals” and “rigorously reject protectionism”.

Ahead of his speech the government unveiled a dramatic proposal to ease its restrictions on foreign investment. Over the past two decades, China has maintained a highly restrictive, complex set of rules on how foreigners can invest on the mainland. In the many industries deemed “strategic”, for example, they must invest only through a joint venture and must transfer technology to the local partner. Flows of funds in and out of the country are also tightly controlled.

The draft reforms, which are now open for comment, include scrapping almost all of these cumbersome controls. Foreign firms would supposedly be treated the same way as national ones. The clunky system of case-by-case approvals will be replaced by a simpler “negative list”: if your industry is not on it, you do not need permission to invest. Daniel Roules of the Shanghai office of Squire Patton Boggs, an American law firm, believes the new law—if and when it comes into force—could usher in a significant and welcome change in the climate for foreign firms.

Mr Li is also pushing for bilateral investment treaties with the United States and the European Union, which could further reassure foreign investors worried about putting more money into China. His boss, Xi Jinping, agreed a sweeping free-trade agreement with Australia on the heels of the recent G20 summit in Brisbane. This provisional deal, which must now be ratified, goes much further than previous accords in opening up China’s service industries to foreign investment.

Taken together, say optimists, there could yet be another golden age for foreign direct investment (FDI) into China. A recent report by King & Wood Mallesons, China’s biggest law firm, forecasts that FDI could reach $188 billion in 2020, up from about $120 billion last year.

Nevertheless, foreign businesspeople should not break out the champagne yet. The proposed reforms are a strong signal that foreign money will continue to be welcome in China. However, they may do nothing to help foreign-owned firms compete on equal terms with politically well-connected domestic ones, to end the subsidies lavished on state-backed enterprises, or to rein in regulators keen on bashing outsiders. The areas of business most tempting for foreigners, such as finance and the internet, will still have restrictions on foreign ownership. If China’s leaders were to take on all these distortions, then they would get a far warmer round of applause at their next Davos appearance.

商务部关于《外商投资企业设立及变更备案管理暂行办法》(征求意见稿)公开征求意见的通知

文章来源:商务部条约法律司

2016-09-03 12:00
文章类型:原创 内容分类:政策
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  为在全国范围内复制推广自由贸易试验区的试点经验,实行外商投资准入前国民待遇加负面清单管理模式,2016年9月3日,十二届全国人大常委会第二十二次会议表决通过了《全国人民代表大会常务委员会关于修改〈中华人民共和国外资企业法〉等四部法律的决定》(以下简称《决定》)。《决定》将于2016年10月1日起施行。

《决定》对《中华人民共和国外资企业法》、《中华人民共和国合资经营企业法》、《中华人民共和国合作经营企业法》以及《中华人民共和国台湾同胞投资保护法》相关行政审批条款作出修改,将不涉及国家规定准入特别管理措施的外商投资企业和台胞投资企业的设立及变更,由审批改为备案管理。为确保法律衔接顺畅,做好备案管理工作,商务部起草了《外商投资企业设立及变更备案管理暂行办法》(征求意见稿)(以下简称《征求意见稿》)。《征求意见稿》全面贯彻落实简政放权、放管结合、协同监管的要求,就适用范围、备案程序、监督检查、法律责任等内容做出规范,同时规定港澳台投资者投资备案事项参照本办法办理。

作为重要配套措施,有关外商投资企业设立及变更备案管理的规定,需与《决定》同时施行。为广泛听取社会各界意见,现将《征求意见稿》向社会公布。公众可以通过以下途径提出意见:

1.登陆商务部网站(网址:http://www.mofcom.gov.cn)进入“征求意见”点击“《外商投资企业设立及变更备案管理暂行办法》(征求意见稿)征求意见”提出意见。

2.电子邮件:investmentlaw@mofcom.gov.cn

3.传真:010-65198905。

4.信函:北京市东长安街2号商务部条约法律司,邮编:100731。

请在电子邮件主题、传真首页和信封上注明“《备案管理办法》公开征求意见”。

由于时间较紧,意见反馈截至日期为2016年9月22日。
商 务 部
2016年9月3日

 

外商投资企业设立及变更备案管理暂行办法

(征求意见稿)

 

第一章 总则

第一条(目的和依据)为进一步扩大对外开放,推进外商投资管理体制改革,完善法治化、国际化、便利化的营商环境,根据《中华人民共和国中外合资经营企业法》、《中华人民共和国中外合作经营企业法》、《中华人民共和国外资企业法》、《中华人民共和国公司法》及相关法律、行政法规及国务院决定,制定本办法。

第二条(适用范围)外商投资企业的设立及变更,不涉及国家规定实施准入特别管理措施(负面清单)的,适用本办法。

第三条(备案机构)国务院商务主管部门,各省、自治区、直辖市、计划单列市、新疆生产建设兵团、副省级城市的商务主管部门,以及自由贸易试验区、国家级经济技术开发区的相关机构是外商投资企业设立及变更的备案机构。

国务院商务主管部门负责统筹和指导全国范围内外商投资企业设立及变更的备案管理工作。

省、自治区、直辖市、计划单列市、新疆生产建设兵团、副省级城市的商务主管部门,自由贸易试验区、国家级经济技术开发区的相关机构负责本区域内外商投资企业设立及变更的备案管理工作。

备案机构通过外商投资综合管理信息系统(以下简称备案系统)开展备案工作。

第四条(如实备案)外商投资企业或其投资者应当依照本办法真实、准确、完整地提供备案信息,填写备案申报承诺书,不得有虚假记载、误导性陈述或重大遗漏。外商投资企业或其投资者应妥善保存与已提交备案信息相关的证明材料。

第二章 备案程序

第五条(企业设立备案)设立外商投资企业,属于本办法规定的备案范围的,在取得企业名称预核准后,应由全体投资者(或外商投资股份有限公司的全体发起人,以下简称全体发起人)指定的代表或共同委托的代理人在营业执照签发前,或由外商投资企业指定的代表或委托的代理人在营业执照签发后30日内,通过备案系统,在线填报和提交《外商投资企业设立备案申报表》(以下简称《设立申报表》)及相关文件,办理设立备案手续。

第六条(企业变更备案)属于本办法规定的备案范围的外商投资企业,发生以下变更事项的,应由外商投资企业指定的代表或委托的代理人在变更事项发生后30日内通过备案系统在线填报和提交《外商投资企业变更备案申报表》(以下简称《变更申报表》)及相关文件,办理变更备案手续:

(一)外商投资企业基本信息变更,包括名称、注册地址、企业类型、经营期限、投资行业、业务类型、经营范围、项目性质、注册资本、投资总额、组织机构构成、法定代表人、外商投资企业最终实际控制人信息、联系人及联系方式变更;

(二)外商投资企业投资者基本信息变更,包括姓名(名称)、国籍或地址(注册地或注册地址)、证照类型及号码、认缴出资额、出资方式、出资期限、资金来源地、投资者类型变更;

(三)股权(股份)、合作权益变更,包括股权质押;

(四)合并、分立、终止;

(五)外资企业财产权益对外抵押转让;

(六)中外合作企业外国合作者先行回收投资;

(七)中外合作企业委托经营管理。

外商投资企业最高权力机构作出变更决议或决定的时间为外商投资企业变更事项的发生时间;法律法规对外商投资企业变更事项的生效条件另有要求的,以满足相应要求的时间为变更事项的发生时间。

第七条(在线提交文件)外商投资企业或其投资者办理外商投资企业设立或变更备案手续,需通过备案系统上传提交以下文件:

(一)外商投资企业名称预先核准材料或外商投资企业营业执照;

(二)外商投资企业全体投资者(或全体发起人)或其授权代表签署的《外商投资企业设立备案申报承诺书》,或外商投资企业法定代表人或其授权代表签署的《外商投资企业变更备案申报承诺书》;

(三)全体投资者(或全体发起人)或外商投资企业指定代表或者共同委托代理人的证明,包括授权委托书及被委托人的身份证明;

(四)外商投资企业投资者或法定代表人委托他人签署相关文件的证明,包括授权委托书及被委托人的身份证明(未委托他人签署相关文件的,无需提供);

(五)投资者主体资格证明或自然人身份证明(变更事项不涉及投资者基本信息变更的,无需提供);

(六)法定代表人自然人身份证明(变更事项不涉及法定代表人变更的,无需提供)。

第八条(实际投资变化备案)外商投资企业的投资者在营业执照签发前已提交备案信息的,如实际投资情况发生变化,应在营业执照签发后30日内向备案机构就变化情况履行变更备案手续。

第九条(已设立企业的变更备案)在本办法实施前已批准设立的外商投资企业发生变更,且属于本办法规定的备案范围的,应办理备案手续,完成备案的,其《外商投资企业批准证书》同时失效。

第十条(备案转为审批)备案管理的外商投资企业发生的变更事项涉及外商投资准入特别管理措施(负面清单)的,应按照外商投资相关法律法规办理审批手续。

第十一条(备案办理程序)外商投资企业或其投资者在线提交《设立申报表》或《变更申报表》及相关文件后,备案机构对填报信息形式上的完整性和准确性进行核对,并对申报事项是否属于备案范围进行甄别。属于本办法规定的备案范围的,备案机构应在3个工作日内完成备案。不属于备案范围的,备案机构应在线通知外商投资企业或其投资者按有关规定办理,并通知相关部门依法处理。

备案机构发现外商投资企业或其投资者填报的信息形式上不完整、不准确,或需要其对经营范围作出进一步说明的,应一次性告知其在15日内在线补充提交相关信息。提交补充信息的时间不计入备案机构的备案时限。如外商投资企业或其投资者未能在15日内补齐相关信息,备案机构将在线告知外商投资企业或其投资者未完成备案。外商投资企业或其投资者可就同一设立或变更事项另行提出备案申请,已实施该设立或变更事项的,应于7日内另行提出。

备案机构应通过备案系统发布备案结果并在线通知外商投资企业或其投资者。外商投资企业或其投资者可在备案系统中查询备案结果信息。

第十二条(领取备案回执)收到备案完成通知后,外商投资企业或其投资者可凭外商投资企业名称预核准材料(复印件)或外商投资企业营业执照(复印件)向备案机构领取《外商投资企业设立备案回执》或《外商投资企业变更备案回执》(以下简称《备案回执》)。

第十三条(备案回执内容)备案机构出具的《备案回执》载明如下内容:

(一)外商投资企业或其投资者已提交设立或变更备案申报材料,且符合形式要求;

(二)备案的外商投资企业设立或变更事项;

(三)该外商投资企业设立或变更事项属于备案范围;

(四)是否符合国家相关减免税规定及减免税范围。

第三章 监督管理

第十四条(监督检查)备案机构对外商投资企业及其投资者遵守本办法情况实施监督检查。

备案机构可采取定期抽查、根据举报进行检查、根据有关部门或司法机关的建议和反映的情况进行检查,以及依职权启动检查等方式开展监督检查。

备案机构与公安、国有资产、海关、税务、工商、证券、外汇等有关行政管理部门应密切协同配合,加强信息共享。备案机构在监督检查的过程中发现外商投资企业或其投资者有不属于本部门管理职责的违法违规行为,应及时通报有关部门。

第十五条(抽查方式)备案机构应当按照公平规范的要求,根据外商投资企业的备案编号等随机摇号,确定抽查的企业,对外商投资企业及其投资者进行监督检查。抽查结果由备案机构通过商务部外商投资信息公示系统予以公示。

第十六条(根据举报检查)公民、法人或其他组织发现外商投资企业或其投资者存在违反本办法的行为的,可以向备案机构举报。举报采取书面形式,有明确的被举报人,并提供相关事实和证据的,备案机构接到举报后应当进行必要的核查。

第十七条(根据有关部门建议检查)其他有关部门或司法机关在履行其职责的过程中,发现外商投资企业或其投资者有违反本办法的行为的,可以向备案机构提出监督检查的建议,备案机构接到相关建议后应当及时进行核查。

第十八条(依职权启动检查)对于未按本办法的规定进行备案,或曾有备案不实、对监督检查不予配合、拒不履行备案机构作出的行政处罚决定记录的外商投资企业或其投资者,备案机构可依职权对其启动检查。

第十九条(监督检查的内容)备案机构对外商投资企业及其投资者进行监督检查的内容包括:

(一)是否按照本办法规定履行备案手续;

(二)外商投资企业或其投资者所填报的备案信息是否真实、准确、完整;

(三)是否在外商投资准入特别管理措施中所列的禁止投资领域开展投资经营活动;

(四)是否未经审批在外商投资准入特别管理措施中所列的限制投资领域开展投资经营活动;

(五)是否存在触发国家安全审查的情形;

(六)是否履行备案机构作出的行政处罚决定。

第二十条(配合检查)检查时,备案机构可以依法查阅或者要求被检查人提供有关材料,被检查人应当如实提供。

第二十一条(检查纪律)备案机构实施检查不得妨碍被检查人正常的生产经营活动,不得接受被检查人提供的财物或者服务,不得谋取其他非法利益。

第二十二条(诚信档案)备案机构和其他主管部门在监督检查中掌握的反映外商投资企业或其投资者诚信状况的信息,应记入商务部外商投资诚信档案系统。其中,对于未按本办法规定进行备案、备案不实、对监督检查不予配合或拒不履行备案机构作出的行政处罚决定的,备案机构应将相关诚信信息以适当方式通过商务部外商投资信息公示系统予以公示。

商务部与相关部门共享外商投资企业及其投资者的诚信信息。

备案机构依据前二款公示或者共享的诚信信息不得含有外商投资企业或其投资者的个人隐私、商业秘密,或国家秘密。

第二十三条(诚信信息修正)外商投资企业及其投资者可以查询商务部外商投资诚信档案系统中的自身诚信信息,如认为有关信息记录不完整或者有错误的,可以提供相关证明材料并向备案机构申请修正。经核查属实的,予以修正。

第四章 法律责任

第二十四条(违反备案义务的法律责任)外商投资企业或其投资者违反本办法的规定,未能按期履行或逃避履行备案义务,或在进行备案时隐瞒真实情况、存在重大遗漏、提供误导性或虚假信息的,备案机构应责令限期改正;逾期不改正,或情节严重的,处违法所得1倍以上3倍以下的罚款,但最高不得超过3万元。

第二十五条(违反准入许可的法律责任)外商投资企业或其投资者未经审批在外商投资准入特别管理措施所列的限制投资领域开展投资经营活动的,备案机构应责令其限期改正,停止开展相关投资经营活动,并处违法所得3倍的罚款,但最高不得超过3万元。

第二十六条(在不得投资领域投资的法律责任)外商投资企业或其投资者在外商投资准入特别管理措施所列的禁止投资领域开展投资经营活动的,备案机构应责令停止开展相关投资经营活动、限期处分股权或其他资产,并处违法所得3倍的罚款,但最高不得超过3万元。

第二十七条(不配合监督检查的法律责任)外商投资企业或其投资者逃避、拒绝或以其他方式阻挠备案机构监督检查的,由备案机构责令改正,可处1万元以下的罚款。

第二十八条(公职人员的法律责任)备案机构工作人员在备案或监督管理的过程中滥用职权、玩忽职守、徇私舞弊、索贿受贿的,依法给予行政处分;构成犯罪的,依法追究刑事责任。

第五章 附则

第二十九条(反垄断审查)外商投资事项涉及反垄断审查的,按相关规定办理。

第三十条(依职权提起国家安全审查)外商投资事项涉及国家安全审查的,按相关规定办理。备案机构在办理备案手续或监督检查时发现该外商投资事项属于国家安全审查范围,而外商投资企业的投资者未向商务部提出国家安全审查申请的,备案机构应及时告知投资者向商务部提出安全审查申请,并暂停办理相关手续,同时将有关情况报商务部。

第三十一条(投资性公司、创业投资企业、股权投资企业)外商投资的投资性公司、创业投资企业、股权投资企业视同外国投资者,适用本办法。

第三十二条(港澳台投资者备案)香港特别行政区、澳门特别行政区、台湾地区投资者投资不涉及国家规定实施准入特别管理措施的,参照本办法办理。

第三十三条(港澳服务提供者备案)香港服务提供者在内地仅投资《<内地与香港关于建立更紧密经贸关系的安排>服务贸易协议》对香港开放的服务贸易领域,澳门服务提供者在内地仅投资《<内地与澳门关于建立更紧密经贸关系的安排>服务贸易协议》对澳门开放的服务贸易领域,其公司设立及变更的备案按照《港澳服务提供者在内地投资备案管理办法(试行)》办理。

第三十四条(解释部门)本办法由商务部负责解释。

第三十五条(施行日期)本办法自  年  月  日起施行。

 

附件:1.外商投资企业设立备案申报材料

2.外商投资企业变更备案申报材料

3.外商投资企业设立备案回执

4.外商投资企业变更备案回执