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Chinese Law on Security
Interests
Intro:
My topic is the law and practice of security interests in
China. I choose this topic because of this book, Professor
Wood's Comparative Law of Security and Guarantees. I am dissatisfied
with only one page of this masterpiece of international security
law, the page dealing with China. In page 6, the author is
this book, who happens to have the same name with our tutor
of global comparative financial law, indicated his disappointment
at the Chinese law on security interests, characterizing it
as "undeveloped," together with only Islamic countries.
Well, but I shouldn't complain because when Professor Wood
was writing this book, there was nothing to convince him the
Chinese security law was developed. But probably only a few
days, maybe a few weeks, after the publication of this book,
in 1995 China promulgated its first Security Law, a comprehensive
code on secured transactions. Following this law, there are
a number of regulations and orders issued by the Supreme Court
of China, which, together with the national security law,
collective constitute the security legal regime. So in my
50 minutes, I would like to give you an introduction to this
law and briefly comment on some of its existing problems.
First part of this talk, the general background of the law.
There are two things worth noting in this regard. First, the
law was a result and momentum of China's reform and opening
door policy. China launched capitalism and market-economy
oriented reform in late 1970s, that's much earlier than any
of communist brothers in the world. That's probably because
China broke up the Soviet Union as early as late 1950s and
conducted solo practice of its own socialism that's quite
apart from the conventional understanding of socialism. The
Chinese reform could be characterized by two words, namely,
"decentralization" and "privatization."
In essence, it is a process in which state gradually relinquish
control over national economy. On one hand, the state grants
more autonomy to state-owned enterprises and ask them to operate
for its own profit from the market. On the other hand, the
state encourages the growth of private companies and private
industries. There was a World Bank figure showing that, by
1999, private industries constituted 71 percent of the Chinese
economy. As a result, banks, under the pressure of making
profit, stopped to provide free and unchecked money to companies,
and instead ask both state own enterprises and private companies
to provide collaterals and guarantees in order to obtain financial
support from banks. This created market need for rule of law
in this area.
The second background is that the Chinese is very eager to
make its commercial laws in conformity with international
standards and certain Western norms in order to attract foreign
investments. Foreign investors in China, when they are dealing
with Chinese partners in relation to financial and commercial
transactions, requires a set of legal rules that can provides
certainty and protection. This is, by no means, a trivial
thing but rather very strong request from a powerful group
because, in the past decade, China is one of the two largest
recipients of foreign investment in the whole world. Another
country is the United States. And last year, foreign investment
in China totaled 52 billion US dollars, that's much higher
than what the U.S. received in last year.
Second Part is about the content of the security law.
In brief, the established relatively a modern legal system
for creating and enforcing security over business and personal
property and guarantees of debt, allowing commercial banks
and financial institutions to secure their loans with collateral
or guarantees. It created five different types of security
devices, including mortgage, pledge, guarantees, lien, and
earnest (or deposit). Generally speaking, the law integrated
elements of both common law and civil. In particular it was
influenced by American UCC Article 9 and German law. You may
find the major provisions of the law are quite similar to
those in other countries, but there are some Chinese characteristics.
Such as:
" Mandatory registration for certain assets: in the
U.S. and many other countries, notice filing, which is equated
with Chinese registration as a matter of procedure, is generally
necessary only to perfect a security interest and not mandatory.
But in the Chinese law, registration is mandatory for creating
security interests over land, urban buildings, transportation
vehicles, forests and trees, and equipments and movables of
enterprises.
" Secondly, in enforcement of security interest, there
is no such thing as "self-help" remedy. According
to the UCC, a lender may take possession of the mortgaged
property without the consent of the debtor/mortgagor if that
can be done without a "breach of the peace." But
in China, if you want to realize your security interest, you
must first enter into friendly negotiation with the person
who owes you money to discuss the disposal of the mortgaged
assets. God knows that person will not negotiate with you
friendly. Otherwise you have to go to court to litigate the
issue and every person would know how costly it will be.
" Third, with respect to priority issue in the process
of insolvency, secured debts enjoy super-priority, ranking
ahead of all other creditors, be it a priority creditor or
unsecured creditor.
" There are also some other features worth mentioning
but I am afraid I don't have the time.
Finally, I would like to make some comments on the Chinese
security law.
First, it's still in a primitive stage and has a long way
to go toward becoming a sophisticate system. In addition,
Chinese courts have appeared to be very conservative in recognizing
new types of securities. For example, in practice it proved
very difficult to persuade Chinese court to accept the concept
of independent guarantee. It takes time, I believe.
Secondly, there is a mentality behind the existing law, that
is social stability is more important than creditors' rights
and interests. So Chinese courts in many situations are very
reluctant to help creditors to enforce and liquidate their
security if that would lead to bankruptcy and massive lay-off
of corporate employees.
Well, guess my time is up. Thank you.
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